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ABSTRACT 
 
Russell Bither-Terry: Zero Hunger: The Politics of anti-Hunger Policy in Brazil 
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber) 
 
In 2003 Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) announced a 
nationwide Zero Hunger Program (Programa Fome Zero) and created the Special 
Ministry for Food Security (MESA), headed by José Graziano, to integrate a wide range 
initiatives to eliminate the “vicious cycle” of hunger. Within a year President Lula had 
merged MESA’s Food Card program with three other cash transfers to form a conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) called Bolsa Família (Family Allowance). He also merged MESA 
into the new Ministry of Social Development headed by Patrus Ananias.  
This dissertation asks (1) why anti-hunger policies ultimately took the form they 
did and (2) how well they have worked to reduce poverty and hunger. Regarding the first 
question, it argues that program implementation initially failed in 2003 because the 
design was too complex and did not engage constructively with policy legacies from the 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso government. In contrast to the Food Card, Bolsa Família 
represented a simpler program that built on those legacies. The dissertation supports this 
assessment with evidence from government documents, media reports, and interviews 
fieldwork in Brazil (October 2010-July 2011).  
Regarding poverty, previous studies find that Bolsa Família is directly 
responsible for a reduction in headcount poverty (H) of only 1-2 percentage points. This 
 iv	  
dissertation uses the income gap (I), intensity (HI), and ordinal poverty (O) measures to 
analyze Brazil’s National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) and demonstrates that the 
program led to a much more substantial reduction in the severity of poverty than in 
headcount poverty.  
Regarding hunger, malnutrition had already declined sharply before President 
Lula took office, but food insecurity declined by about a third from 2004-2009. The 
dissertation provides evidence that Bolsa Família contributed to this decline, showing 
that the increase in food security strongly correlates with the expansion of Bolsa Família 
at the state level. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
  
 To understand what Brazil’s Zero Hunger Program (Programa Fome Zero) 
reveals about the politics of designing and implementing new pro-poor social policies, we 
must begin with the inauguration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known simply as 
Lula. It was in his inaugural address that he announced to the world that Zero Hunger 
would be his government’s flagship program. 
 Two hundred thousand people from all over Brazil assembled on the National 
Mall. Many waved Brazilian flags or Workers’ Party (PT) flags. It was January 1, 2003 
and they were there to witness—and celebrate—a turning point in history. 
 For decades being a Brazilian leftist had meant getting used to losing. In 1964, the 
military deposed leftist President João Goulart in a coup because he threatened elite 
economic interests. The late 1960’s saw increasing repression of leftists through 
censorship, torture, imprisonment, and “disappearances.” Though the “Brazilian Miracle” 
brought rapid economic growth, inequality increased and the economy left many of the 
weakest and poorest behind. After the return of democracy, Lula—running as the major 
left-wing candidate—lost three elections in a row: 1989, 1994, and 1998 before his 
election in 2002. Being a Brazilian leftist had meant losing, but now a leftist had just won 
the presidency.  
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 The above mostly focuses on the negative, but being a Brazilian leftist also meant 
incremental hard-fought gains. In 1978-1980 a series of massive strikes paralyzed the 
industrial center of São Paulo, and showed that it was possible to go up against the 
military government and win. Lula was their young, charismatic leader, representing a 
new kind of unionism. In 1980, (after the military government legalized the formation of 
political parties beyond the two official sanctioned parties), the labor movement, the 
progressive church, and leftist intellectuals came together to organize the Worker’s Party. 
In 1983, millions filled the streets demanding direct presidential elections. In stark 
contrast to the region’s dominant neoliberalism, the new Brazilian Constitution of 1988 
included extensive social and economic rights.  
 Workers’ Party (PT) candidates ran for office and some won. In the 1990’s the 
party gained a reputation for “the PT way of governing:” honest, pragmatic, and 
progressive. In Porto Alegre the PT government enacted an innovative system of 
participatory budgeting which allowed citizens to debate and decide spending priorities 
for their communities (Wampler 2007). The PT Governor of The Federal District, 
Cristovam Buarque, enacted a program called School Allowance which paid small 
amounts of money to poor families provided they sent their children to school; education 
would be the pathway out of poverty (Aguiar and Araújo 2002). The government of Belo 
Horizonte declared food a human right and worked to integrate the actions of the city and 
civil society, earning it the attention of prominent food activists (Lappé and Lappé 2002).  
 Lula’s election did not come out of nowhere. It was the product of decades of 
sustained organizing. The hope was that, as President, Lula would be able to enact 
nationwide the kinds of policies PT governments had enacted at the state and local levels.  
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The newly elected president recognized that hope when, after the standard formality of 
listing those present, Lula began his actual address: 
 “Change”: this is the key word. It was the great message from Brazilian society in 
the October elections. Hope finally overcame fear, and Brazilian society decided that 
it was the hour to take a new path (da Silva 2003, my translation). 
The magazine Veja reported that he used the word “change” (mudança) fourteen times in 
the speech.1 It was clearly the central theme. He spoke of the long struggle that had 
brought him to this point and of the need for change “with courage and care, with 
humility and boldness.” He then narrowed the focus: 
In a country with so much fertile land and so many people who want to work, 
there is no reason whatsoever to talk about hunger. Nevertheless, millions of 
Brazilians, in the countryside and the city, in the most forsaken rural areas and in 
the urban outskirts, are, at this very moment, without food. They survive 
miraculously under the poverty line, when they don’t die of misery, begging for a 
piece of bread. 
It is an old story. Brazil experienced the riches of the mills and sugarcane 
plantations in the early colonial times, but it did not overcome hunger; it 
proclaimed national independence and abolished slavery, but it did not overcome 
hunger; it experienced the riches of the gold deposits in Minas Gerais, and in 
coffee production in the Valley of Paraíba, but it did not overcome hunger; it 
industrialized and forged a notable and diverse industrial park, but it did not 
overcome hunger. It cannot continue like this. 
As long as there is a Brazilian brother or a Brazilian sister going hungry, we have 
more than enough reason to be ashamed. 
For this reason, I set among the priorities of my government a food security 
program called “Zero Hunger.” As I said in my first pronouncement after the 
election, if, at the end of my term, all Brazilians can eat breakfast, lunch, and 
dinner, I will have completed my life’s mission (my translation).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Brasil, Sandra. January 8, 2003. “Ele falou em mudar 14 veces.” Veja. Chapter 3 relies 
on many news articles with no byline. Since parenthetical citations to those sources—a 
long list of full titles in the middle of a paragraph—would make that chapter difficult to 
read, I decided that consistently citing news periodicals in footnotes is the least bad 
option. 
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 This dissertation is about the subsequent attempts to make good on this promise. 
Specifically, it asks (1) why Brazil implemented the anti-hunger policies it did and (2) 
how well they worked at reducing poverty and hunger. It argues that the need for 
continuity with existing policies and for a simplified approach that limited the number of 
possible roadblocks were two key factors that led the Lula Government to ultimately 
adopt the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família2 and that this approach has 
been effective in reducing poverty and hunger. More generally, it argues that this 
experience contributes to our understanding of how continuity and complexity shape the 
success of policies aimed to fight poverty and hunger. 
Defining the Object of Study 	  
 The idea for a Zero Hunger program had been sketched in a 2001 proposal from 
The Citizenship Institute (Instituto Cidadania), a think tank directed by Lula and charged 
with sketching out concrete alternatives to existing policies (Citizenship Institute 2001: 
13-39). Zero Hunger was to be a broad initiative aimed at social transformation. While 
emergency measures would meet the immediate needs of an estimated 44 million hungry 
Brazilians, the larger goal was to create “a new economic development model” to replace 
Brazil’s “perverse growth model, ” which was based on a “vicious cycle” of under-
consumption and under-production of food (Citizenship Institute 2001: 17-19; see Figure 
1.1). Thus they sought to combat this through both supply-side and demand-side policies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Throughout this dissertation, I adopt the practice of using English names for programs 
and ministries in order to make the findings accessible to as wide an audience as possible. 
The exception is Bolsa Família, which is well known and is more commonly referred to 
in English texts by its Portuguese name than by English translations such as “Family 
Allowance” or “Family Grant.” 
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(see Figure 1.2). As president Lula would now have the opportunity to put Zero Hunger 
into practice.  
 Ten years after Zero Hunger’s launch, there is still disagreement over how well 
the program worked. A 2013 column in The Hindu by Anurodh Lalit Jain offers Zero 
Hunger as a model for the world’s largest democracy: 
…countries like Brazil have made significant leaps in overcoming hunger by 
providing food security to the citizens. Brazil’s Fome Zero or Zero Hunger 
programme was initiated by the government in 2003. Based on the pillars of 
conditional cash transfer, school meals and strengthening family agriculture, Fome 
Zero has been able to reduce poverty, provide food security and reduce hunger. 
Within five years, Brazil’s child mortality rate was reduced by 13 points and 20 
million people came above the poverty line. Although India and China demonstrated 
better economic growth than Brazil in the last decade, Brazil surpassed both countries 
in reducing poverty and increasing food security for its citizens.3 
 
Yet Brazilian Journalist Eliane Cantanhêde writes: “…in practice, Zero Hunger never 
existed. It was a pretty name, a piece of marketing, an empty package [author’s 
translation].”4 
 So, Lalit Jain thinks India should copy Zero Hunger, but Cantanhêde—who 
covered the program in 2003—says there is nothing to copy. During my fieldwork 
(October 2010 to July 2011), I encountered a similar divide during the many informal 
conversations I had with Brazilians about my research. This divide was particularly 
evident in the choice of tense used to describe the program: some spoke of the program as 
being over, others as still going on. It is impossible to have a productive discussion, be it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jain, Anurodh Lalit. “Lessons from Brazil’s Zero Hunger.” June 16, 2013. The Hindu. 
Available at: 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/open-page/lessons-from-brazils-zero-
hunger/article4817950.ece (Accessed November 16, 2013) 
 
4 Cantanhêde, Eliane. “Fome de vitórias.” June 28, 2011. Folha de São Paulo.  Available 
at: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniao/fz2806201104.htm 
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normative or empirical, about “Zero Hunger” if we do not even agree on what the phrase 
means.  
 The problem is that people use the phrase in at least two different ways. Some, 
like Cantanhêde, limit Zero Hunger to the initial program design, when José Graziano led 
a new Special Ministry for Food Security (MESA) and the Food Card, a program 
modeled after the U.S. Food Stamp (now called SNAP), was its major initiative. It is easy 
to see how someone with this limited definition of the program would deem it a failure. 
On January 23, 2004 José Graziano and Minister of Social Assistance Benedita da Silva 
left their posts, and their ministries were combined into the new Ministry of Social 
Development (MDS), headed by Patrus Ananias.5 A few months earlier, in September 
2003, the government had announced a new conditional cash transfer called Bolsa 
Família combining MESA’s Food Card with three transfers inherited from President 
Cardoso.6 It soon became clear that the new program was going to be the government’s 
major anti-poverty initiative. Bolsa Família initially fell under its own Executive 
Secretary (Takagi 2006: 5), but was moved to MDS with the new ministry’s creation. 
 If we think of Zero Hunger as MESA and the Food Card, clearly it was not 
successful because the program ended after one year. Officially, however, Zero Hunger 
continued through Lula’s two terms in office, with Bolsa Família as one of its major 
components. MDS’s full name is the Ministry for Social Development and the Fight 
Against Hunger, and it includes a Secretariat for Food Security. The organizational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Athias, Gabriela and Eduardo Scolese. February 4, 2004. “Lula Aponta Erro e Atrela 
Fome Zero a Cresimento Econômico.” Folha de São Paulo. 
 
6 Athias, Gabriela. September 19, 2003. “Bolsa-Família Vai Unificar Quatro Programas 
Sociais.” Folha de São Paulo. 
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framework for food policy includes participation from civil society through the National 
Council on Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA) and coordination across ministries 
through the Inter-ministerial Assembly for Food Security and Nutrition (CAISAN). 
During my time in Brasilia at the end of Lula’s second term and the start of Dilma 
Rousseff’s presidency, I encountered the Zero Hunger logo on many official publications 
and event banners. The government clearly maintained the brand, even though it 
emphasized Zero Hunger much less than it did in 2003. Both media and scholarship refer 
to this as an “umbrella program” approach: a variety of initiatives spread throughout the 
government with a common goal. 
 It’s their program; they can define it as they wish, and programs evolve over time. 
For instance, the U.S. Secret Service was created after the U.S. Civil War primarily to 
combat counterfeiting, but in the early twentieth century protecting the President became 
its most important job. A 2003 restructuring moved it under the Department of Homeland 
Security (United States Secret Service 2007). No reasonable person would say that it is 
not “really” the Secret Service because it changed its mission and structure, but rather 
that the Secret Service had changed over time. The interesting questions are why Zero 
Hunger ended up becoming an umbrella program and what impact the program had, as 
well as what lessons this offers for theories of social policy. 
 The 2001 proposal outlined a wide range of initiatives, but in 2003 the Food Card 
took up two thirds of MESA’s budget (Takagi 2006: 87) and the bulk of the program’s 
public attention. Given a limited budget and pressure to demonstrate results quickly, it is 
not surprising that the new government focused on emergency measures, but why did 
Brazil abandon MESA in favor of MDS and the Food Card in favor of Bolsa Família? In 
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the most general terms, the programs look similar: they both give money to the poorest to 
let them buy food. However, MESA tried to set the Food Card apart from existing cash 
transfers by creating it as a new, independent program and incorporating a participatory 
process for selecting beneficiaries that made for an incredibly complex and fragile 
implementation process. In contrast, Bolsa Família built on Cardoso’s approach and 
simplified it by combining the existing cash transfers into one program. The streamlined 
process for enrolling new beneficiaries relies on full-time social service professionals 
instead of volunteers. Put simply, they went with Bolsa Família because it works, and it 
works because of this simple approach that built on policy legacies. 
 
Theoretical Frame 	  
 Policy legacies are a common theme in much of the literature on the politics of 
social policy. It seems reasonable to assume that policymakers will generally work within 
the constraints of these legacies. However, Zero Hunger’s first year (2003) is an object 
lesson in what happens when those designing and implementing a program attempt to 
ignore policy legacies. By making a new ministry for hunger and a new cash transfer to 
combat it, even though existing ministries already worked in this area and there were 
existing cash transfers (including one called Food Allowance in the Ministry of Health), 
the new government undermined its own chance of success.  
 Another theme found in public policy literature is that complexity can undermine 
a program’s chance of successful implementation because the more necessary 
components a program has, the more places it can break down. Yet the initial approach to 
Zero Hunger was an attempt to incorporate many different elements of anti-hunger policy 
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into a complex program, both out of commitment to participatory government and 
because of a belief that inter-connected problems require inter-connected solutions.  
 Though Zero Hunger officially included a wide range of initiatives, Bolsa Família 
was the largest new initiative after the shift to the “umbrella approach,” and for this 
reason is the focus of much of this dissertation. To ask if Bolsa Família works is to ask if 
it had a significant impact on poverty and hunger. Given that poverty was the primary 
cause of hunger in Brazil, it made sense to combat hunger by combating poverty and it 
makes intuitive sense that direct income support for the poorest should do this. Posing 
things this way outlines the following theory and hypotheses to test: 
 
Bolsa Família è ê Poverty  è  ê Hunger 
 
 This is deceptively simple. As with the earlier discussion of differing definitions 
of “Zero Hunger,” the problem is that people mean different things by “poverty” and 
“hunger.” Different concepts of poverty and hunger lead to different measures of them, 
which in turn lead to radically different conclusions about program effectiveness. This is 
not to imply that all concepts and measures are equally valid, but it does mean that the 
first step in answering the “How well did it work?” question must be to argue that it is 
more useful to think of a problem in a particular way and to adopt a corresponding 
measure.  
 If we think of poverty as the number of people falling under a poverty line, then 
Bolsa Família has had a minimal impact on poverty. However, if we think that the 
program deserves “partial credit” for improving the lot of those under a given poverty 
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line, the program made impressive gains considering the small size of the benefit. 
Likewise, if we think of hunger in terms of malnutrition—measured by how many 
children are underweight—then hunger had already declined sharply before Lula’s 
presidency to a level that was comparatively low for a developing country. On the other 
hand, if we think of hunger as food security, which means having access to enough food, 
then hunger remained a problem when Lula took office and declined significantly while 
he was in office. Chapters 4 and 5 engage with these choices in greater detail. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 	  
 The rest of this dissertation expands upon these central arguments. Chapter 2 
reviews the literature to see what we already know about this dissertation’s research 
questions and, on the basis of this knowledge, looks for some likely answers. For the 
“Why these policies?” question, it begins by framing hunger as a political problem and 
explaining the kinds of policies likely to successfully combat it. Next, it looks at how 
these policies are shaped by politics, drawing on work on the welfare state and on 
Brazilian politics. This work does not fully answer my questions because many of the 
variables it posits as being important do not vary between the Food Card and Bolsa 
Família. However, work on the importance of continuity with policy legacies and on the 
complexity of program design helps form hypotheses about likely causes of this 
difference. It then reviews studies of Bolsa Família’s impact on poverty and hunger, 
outlining some specific places where additional evaluations would be useful. 
 Chapter 3 takes up the question of why Zero Hunger took the form it did. In 
hindsight, the failure of MESA and the Food Card was likely overdetermined. Still, this 
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case illustrates several important principles of policy implementation. The first of these is 
continuity with policy legacies. The initial approach to Zero Hunger attempted to create a 
new institution (MESA) to carry out a new cash transfer (the Food Card), while Bolsa 
Família opted to build on existing cash transfers by combining them. Second, the initial 
approach was incredibly complex, requiring “clearance” from a great number of parties 
to succeed. This was especially evident in the decision to charge local Management 
Committees, with a majority of members from civil society, with selecting beneficiaries.  
 Chapter 4 examines Bolsa Família’s impact on poverty. The program recently 
finished its first decade, so it has clearly been successful from the standpoint of 
durability. But has it actually reduced poverty? The traditional approach to poverty 
measurement is to count the number of people with incomes under a given poverty line. 
This approach consistently finds that the program brought very few people out of 
poverty. However, there is also a long tradition of thinking of poverty as a continuous 
variable and developing measures to capture this. These measures demonstrate that Bolsa 
Família has played an important role in lessening poverty intensity. 
 Chapter 5 turns to Bolsa Familia’s impact on hunger. Given the role it played in 
lessening poverty intensity, it seems reasonable to expect Bolsa Família to have lessened 
hunger as well. Here again, concepts shape results. I argue that framing Zero Hunger’s 
goal as “three meals a day” and focusing on access to food mean that the program should 
be assessed according to its impact on food security—households reporting that they are 
able to buy food of sufficient quantity and quality. Looking at hunger this way, it is clear 
that the overall “umbrella approach”—that is, the sum total of all of the government’s 
policies— contributed to a reduction in food insecurity. Figuring out how much credit 
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Bolsa Família deserves is more challenging, but I combine several approaches to looking 
at the data, all of which strongly suggest that the program made a significant contribution 
to combatting food insecurity. 
 Chapter 6 reflects on Zero Hunger’s lessons for anti-hunger policy more 
generally. Several countries have been designing Zero Hunger programs of their own and 
there is also a United Nations campaign by the same name. Given that Brazil is the 
explicit model for these programs, it is vital that policymakers understand what the 
program actually was, how it changed over time, what parts might be copied and, just as 
importantly, what mistakes to avoid. This chapter will also draw on the theoretical 
contribution my study makes to our understanding of pro-poor policies in developing 
countries.  
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Figure 1.1: The problem. 
 
 
 
From Graziano da Silva et al. 2011 p. 20. 
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Figure 1.2: The solution. 
 
 
 
From Graziano da Silva et al. 2011 p. 21
	  CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 	  
The introduction sketched this dissertation’s key arguments. To restate, continuity 
with policies from the Cardoso Government and a relatively simple design explain why 
Bolsa Família emerged as Lula’s most prominent social policy initiative and why his 
government merged MESA into MDS. This simplified approach should be effective at 
combating poverty and hunger. This chapter grounds this argument in several literatures 
and outlines the places where the next three chapters will make contributions. 
 
Hunger 	  
We begin with research on hunger, outlining why it exists, and what policies can 
address it. Drèze and Sen (1989: 7) emphasize the importance of distinguishing between 
famine (“acute starvation and a sharp increase of mortality”) and chronic hunger 
(“sustained nutritional deprivation on a persistent basis”). While famines may receive 
more attention, “most hunger-related deaths do not occur in famines” (Leathers and 
Foster 2009: 2).7 In the case of Brazil and Latin America, the problem is one of chronic 
hunger and not famine, and thus I focus on what the literature has to say about this 
problem. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7There is much overlap in Sen’s analysis of the two: “Even in analyzing endemic 
undernourishment and persistent, long-run deprivation later on in this study I shall draw 
on some of the concepts that the study of famines will yield” (Sen 1999) 
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Hunger as a Political Problem 	  
While one intuitive cause of hunger is an aggregate shortage of food in the world, 
this does not hold up to careful analysis. Sen’s Poverty and Famines (1981) rejects this 
explanation both at the theoretical level and in the examination of four specific famines. 
For example, he demonstrates that there was actually more food present in Bengal during 
the 1943 Bengal Famine than in 1941, but that hoarding led to prices many could not 
afford. He summarizes this perspective in Development as Freedom: 
A person may be forced into starvation even where there is plenty of food around 
if he loses his ability to buy food in the market, through a loss of income (for 
example, due to unemployment or the collapse of the market for goods that he 
produces and sells to earn a living). On the other side, even when food supply 
falls sharply in a country or a region, everyone can be saved from starvation by a 
better sharing of the available food...The focus has to be on the economic power 
and substantive freedom of individuals and families to buy enough food, and not 
just on the quantum of food in the country in question (Sen 1999, 161). 
 
This is not to say that food supply is irrelevant, since it impacts prices as well as the 
income of small farmers. This can be especially true in countries that consume more food 
than they produce.  
Drèze and Sen (1989) emphasize the political and social nature of the choices that 
leave people hungry: 
In each social structure, given the prevailing legal, political, and economic 
arrangements, a person can establish command over some alternative commodity 
bundles (any one bundle of which he or she can choose to consume). (9) 
 
The set of rules governing ownership and exchange—i.e. who is entitled to what—is a 
society’s “entitlement framework.”8 When someone is unable to exchange what she has 
(money, labor, assets, etc.) for what she needs (food) this is a case of “entitlement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8This usage of the term entitlement is distinct from the popular usage of the word to 
simply refer to welfare programs, which are only one source of entitlement in this 
framework. 
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failure.” In other words, people go hungry because society’s rules about who gets what 
leave people unable to exchange what they have for what they need. 
They remark, “If politics is ‘the art of the possible’ then conquering world hunger 
has become a political issue in a way it could not have been in the past” (1989:4). The 
modern era is distinct from much of human history in that advances in production mean 
that the capacity to provide enough food to everyone exists (1989: 3). That is, it is 
technically possible; the challenge to doing so is organizing societies to meet this 
objective, which is to say politics. “Political pressure plays a major part in determining 
actions undertaken by governments…” (1989: 19) and “...the forms that public action can 
take will undoubtedly depend on...political and social parameters” (1989: 17). Before 
looking at how politics shapes policy, we need to look at what policies are effective at 
combating hunger. 
 
Policy options 	  
Leathers and Foster (2009) survey a number of possible policy strategies to 
combat hunger. In a market economy the price of food and the quantity produced will be 
determined, like that of any good, by supply and demand. Approaches basically fall into 
two categories: supply side (making food cheaper) and demand side (increasing the 
ability of people to buy food). Economic growth and/or redistribution can raise the 
incomes of the poor and increase their ability to buy food (273-289); direct cash transfers 
like Bolsa Família and the Food Card would fall into this category. They argue that 
consumption subsidies (for example, paying farmers the difference between the market 
price and a guaranteed minimum price) are inefficient and expensive (305-322). Policies 
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to combat urban bias, such as investing in rural infrastructure, can decrease food prices 
by decreasing costs of production and transportation (336-341). Lastly, public investment 
in technology to increase food supply can reduce food costs. A greater food supply means 
the poor require less of an increase in income to meet their food needs.  
Cash transfers, as well as many of the other ideas in the 2001 proposal fall into 
the categories just outlined, so Leathers and Foster’s work helps understand why the 
Food Card and Bolsa Família might be expected to work. Drèze and Sen argue that such 
policy responses will be the result of politics. However, “political pressure” is a vague 
phrase; the study of how those pressures and parameters play out constitutes a good 
portion of the field of political science. Fortunately, other literatures provide a detailed 
treatment of the process of policy formation and implementation. 
 
Politics 
 
Politics of the Welfare State 	  
What kinds of governments are more likely to carry out these kinds of policies? 
Given that poverty is a key cause of hunger, the political determinants of effective anti-
hunger policies are likely to be similar to those of effective anti-poverty policies. A 
theory called power resource theory holds that “the balance of class power is the primary 
determinant of variations through time and across countries in welfare state effort, 
particularly the distributive outcomes effected by social policy” (Huber and Stephens 
2001: 3). In Latin America this balance is primarily the product of two things: (1) 
democracy creating the possibility for historically excluded classes to win elections and 
 19	  
(2) well-organized left parties actually doing so (Pribble et al. 2009; Huber and Stephens 
2012). 
Sen and Drèze already highlighted the importance of democracy for responding 
to public pressure. Power resource theory is more specific in that it posits the actors 
behind that pressure:   
Democracy has helped underprivileged sectors in Latin America by providing a 
setting within which these groups could organize and mobilize demands for better 
protection. Moreover, the existence of political competition provides incentives to 
politicians to be responsive to such demands. (Pribble et. al. 2009) 
 
Simply put, democracy does not ensure the creation of a welfare state, but makes it a 
possibility.9 
Huber and Stephens (2001) find that left-wing government leads to more 
generous welfare programs in advanced industrial democracies. The extension of this 
research agenda to Latin America finds that democracy and left government are 
associated with lower poverty and lower inequality there (Huber et al. 2006; Pribble et al. 
2009; Huber and Stephens 2012) The focus is on how much left government there is over 
a long period of time (Huber and Stephens 2001, 2012), because a social welfare regime 
is the product of a decades-long political process and generally not something that may 
be quickly established. What has this process looked like in Brazil? 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 There are, of course, a few examples of non-democratic governments pursuing 
progressive social policies in Latin America—most notably post revolutionary Cuba and 
the Peruvian military government of the late 1960s. However, both of these governments 
came to power during a different era and both overthrew non-democratic governments. 
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Brazilian Politics 	  
The specific context of Brazilian policies provides particular challenges for a 
programmatic left. In Democracy Without Equity, Weyland (1996) argues that the failure 
of social reform in the first decade of democracy in Brazil was due to the fragmentation 
of society. This kept the majority, who should theoretically be for reform, from joining 
together to achieve this. The fragmentation also meant that narrow status quo interests 
could block reform in their particular area. Ames (2001) argues that Brazil suffers from 
“an excess of veto players” (12) leading to “deadlock.” Hagopian (1996) finds that 
traditional clientelistic politics is very much alive in rural Brazil and that the same rural 
elites maintained local power during the military government and democratization. All of 
this might have led one to predict Lula would have a tough time expanding Brazil’s 
welfare state in a pro-poor direction. 
One counterbalance to these challenges is a presidency vested with extensive 
formal powers, including the ability to legislate by decree. These provisional measures 
expire if congress does not approve them, but Mainwaring (1997: 63) notes that 
“…presidents have regularly reissued these decrees after they expired.” Presumably a 
successful, popular program will be more likely to eventually win congressional approval 
and become permanent law. Indeed, in the case of Bolsa Família the president has made 
alterations to the program, such as increasing the benefit, through provisional measures 
that congress later converted into law (see Soares 2012). 
The problem with everything discussed so far is that it applies to both the Food 
Card and Bolsa Família. They were both programs to transfer money directly to the 
poorest to increase their ability to buy food, which the literature on hunger says can be an 
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effective strategy. Both were federal programs enacted within less than a year of each 
other by the same government. Both were the products of a left government committed to 
redistribution and to fighting poverty, and both faced the same institutional obstacles. 
Neither power resource theory nor the literature on Brazilian politics can explain why one 
failed and the other became a global model for effective social policy. This is not really a 
shortcoming; it is merely that asking why one failed and the other succeeded goes beyond 
the scope of these literatures. To understand the difference in outcome we must look at 
the differences in (1) the way a program design dealt with policy legacies and (2) 
implementation. 
 
Legacies and continuity 	  
One key decision in program design is how a program positions itself relative to 
policy legacies. A television advertisement for Agnelo Queiroz (PT), elected governor of 
the Federal District in 2010, illustrates this idea well. The advertisement uses a simple 
metaphor: government programs are like stacks of blocks. It begins with a building made 
out of Duplo blocks (or the Brazilian equivalent). A narrator says, “It’s always the same 
story: when the government changes, the new government changes everything the 
previous government did…and starts everything from scratch.” During the description of 
the process, hands disassemble the tower and then build a new one. Then Agnelo 
addresses the viewer, stating: “I’m going to do things differently. My promise is to 
review all the works of the previous government. What was good we’ll continue. What 
was bad we’ll change. This is the new path for our city” (my translation).10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Compromisso de Agnelo. 2010. Available at: 
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By saying “it’s always the same story” Agnelo implies that leftists do this, too, 
and that this needs to change. The visual illustration of hands taking apart the old tower 
and building a new one underscores the unstated point: this work takes time and money. 
Thus, if what the previous government left was good, or at least a decent starting point, 
this amounts to wasted effort. The message is clear: build on what you inherit. 
Having to build on what you inherit is a major theme in some important works on 
the welfare state. Discussing the New Deal in the United States, Weir and Scocpol (1985: 
119) sum up the role of policy legacies as follows: “state structures and policy legacies 
affected the possibilities for new economic ideas to be formulated and applied to 
innovative government policies and influenced the political orientations and capacities of 
conflicting parties and coalitions of social groups.” In his study of the welfare state in the 
U.S. and the U.K., Pierson (1994:171) writes, “When Reagan and Thatcher began to seek 
cutbacks in social programs, the legacies of previous decision makers profoundly 
influenced their prospects for success.” We should likewise expect challenges to an 
government trying to expand the welfare state. Policy legacies have also been 
incorporated into the power resource approach (Huber and Stephens 2001).  
Pribble (2013: 27) argues that policy legacies matter for two reasons. First, they 
“structure the sorts of problems that exist.” To use an example from the present project, 
Lula had to decide what to do about the fractured nature of cash transfers because 
Cardoso ended his term with three separate programs in three separate ministries. Second, 
policy legacies “…influence the reform process by structuring the distribution of power 
within the policy sector—in other words, emboldening some groups while weakening 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wt4jizg6ykI&. Accessed January 13, 2013. [If the link 
fails I downloaded a copy]. 
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others.” So, in the case of cash transfers in Brazil, we should expect those within the state 
benefiting from the pre-Lula status quo to resist encroachment onto their “turf.” Indeed, 
in Chapter 3 we see precisely this response from mayors and people in older ministries. 
It is important not to overstate the impact of policy legacies. Dion (2010: 5) 
advises that “…we should not assume that policy legacies, or feedback effects, are 
automatic or predetermined; actors always play important roles in shaping institutional 
outcomes.” While I agree, I contend that one key to actors’ success is whether they 
understand these legacies and work within the limits they provide, or ignore them. If 
someone in a leadership position overestimates the possibility of a critical juncture, this 
can lead to attempts to enact overambitious policies and, ultimately, failure. On the other 
hand, the literature argues that an accurate assessment of present possibilities that accepts 
these legacies as the necessary point of departure is more likely to yield real, and 
sustainable, gains. Chapter 3 illustrates how the different approaches taken to policy 
legacies help explain why Bolsa Família succeeded and the Food Card failed. 
 
Implementation and its challenges 	  
Cristovam Buarque, former governor of the Federal District and currently one of 
its federal senators, remarked about MESA, “The program with many components rarely 
succeeds.”11 As it happens, this is the thesis of the book commonly credited with 
launching policy implementation as an area of study.12 The full title of Pressman and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Interview with author, Brasilia, Brazil. June 29, 2011. 
 
12 Saetren (2005) points out that it actually was not the first but that it is understandable 
that the authors did not know about previous studies, given the research tools available at 
the time. 
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Wildavsky’s book, originally published in 1973, is Implementation: How Great 
Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or Why It’s Amazing that Federal 
Programs Work at All, This being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration 
as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of 
Ruined Hopes. The study chronicles the efforts of the Economic Development 
Administration (EDA) to enact infrastructure projects in a way that will generate 
employment for African Americans. The EDA’s key projects were a new airport hanger 
and a new port, but it also included small business loans and a health center. A reader of 
their book familiar with Zero Hunger in 2003 would likely find many familiar themes, 
particularly the unexpected problems that complicate and delay progress. This can 
happen even in the case of something that all relevant actors theoretically support, be it 
generating minority employment in Oakland or feeding hungry people in Piauí.13 To use 
language from scholarship that came later (Tsebelis 2002), even when there is no veto 
player trying to kill something, it can still fail. 
For Pressman and Wildavsky the culprit is “the complexity of joint action.” A 
complex program such as what the EDA in Oakland inherently brings together many 
different “participants” who are needed at different “decision points.” This is all the more 
true in a federal system like the U.S. or Brazil. The authors calculate that even if each 
step has high probability of success, it takes surprisingly few steps to bring the joint 
probability of success, and hence the probability of success for the program, below one in 
two (Table 8: p. 107). They chronicle the number of “clearances” required to enact the 
EDA’s policies, finding a total that exceeds this 50-50 chance threshold. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The northeastern state where Zero Hunger began its first programs in 2003.  
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The intuitive appeal of this explanation is doubtless part of the reason for the 
book’s success. Returning to the imagery of Agenlo’s advertisement, imagine two 
children playing with blocks (this time the primitive wooden kind that do not 
interconnect). The first builds a tower a few blocks high. The second uses many more 
blocks to build one tall, complex tower. We know from experience that the tall tower will 
be the less stable of the two creations. If another child wants to knock it over, all it will 
take is a flick of the finger to any supporting block. A breeze or someone walking by 
could also knock it over. In addition, no block is perfect and no block is perfectly 
positioned above the block below it. The more blocks in a structure, the more likely it is 
that these tiny imperfections will add up to instability of the whole creation and it may 
fall even without anything knocking it over. 
Policies are not block towers, but they share the characteristic of having pieces 
that must fit together to form a whole, and, like blocks, the consequence of a block being 
out of place depends on how the blocks are put together. Indeed, this dissertation could 
easily be understood in these terms, leading to a tale of “Zero Hunger: how great 
expectations in Brasília are dashed in Piauí.” Tempting though that may be, doing so 
would ignore key problems with Pressman and Wildavsky’s argument. 
This expectation that federal programs should rarely succeed is at odds with many 
everyday experiences, earning it the name “the Pressman-Wildavsky Paradox.” Bowen 
(1982) agrees that probability theory can be a useful tool when those attempting to 
implement a policy are playing, in the language of game theory, “a game against nature” 
because they have no opponents actively trying to stop a program. She offers four 
addendums which result in a much more optimistic outlook. The first is persistence. 
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Those implementing a policy often get more than one opportunity to pass a particular 
clearance (if your block tower falls down you can build it again). The second is 
packaging clearances together to get everybody on board for a set of clearances (you can 
glue your blocks together so that they are more stable). The third is bandwagons, with 
earlier successes increasing the probability of later ones. She argues all three of these are 
reasonable descriptions of many policy implementation processes. 
The fourth addendum is program reduction, which recognizes the difference 
“between program activities and program goals” (12). She writes: 
If events in Oakland were looked at in this way, the likely conclusion would be 
that most program activities were eventually implemented but that, unfortunately 
if not surprisingly, the goal of increasing minority employment was not achieved. 
This version of the Oakland episode would be recorded as a program design 
failure rather than an implementation failure [my emphasis]. 
 
If the important thing is to achieve a goal and there are several different ways the goal 
might be met, then it makes sense to think of a program as a collection of independent 
component policies, which increases the likelihood that something will succeed. For each 
of these assumptions Bowen shows how they change Pressman and Wildavsky’s results, 
leading to a much greater expectation of successful (or partially successful) 
implementation.  
 Taken together, these yield insights for policy makers’ strategic decisions: 
…let us imagine a hypothetical implementer with limited resources such that he 
or she can only enter into negotiations for twenty clearances. The implementer is 
confronted by three options: (1) he or she can attempt to implement a relatively 
complex program requiring twenty independent clearances, (2) he or she can 
attempt implementation of two smaller independent programs, each requiring ten 
clearances, or (3) he or she can ruthlessly establish priorities and attempt 
implementation of one small program requiring ten clearances. Only this third 
option reserves sufficient resources for persistence in the attempt to gain 
clearances (15). 
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In other words: be careful not to spread efforts too thin or everything will probably fail. 
 While Bowen works from Pressman and Wildavsky’s assumptions, Alexander 
(1989) questions them. He starts with the simple observation that countless complex 
activities succeed every day but “are noticed only when interrupted” (452). He argues 
that the ways Bowen and other scholars have proposed modifying the approach  
“…are just special cases of a more general procedure of modifying the original 
independence assumption of the model. In both cases the mathematical form and 
numerical scale of the modification are essentially arbitrary” (455). While he is correct to 
question the “point-predictions” from these models (to again borrow language from game 
theory) which estimate specific probabilities of failure, we can restate the claim in terms 
of relative, rather than specific, probability. Namely, given a particular implementation 
scenario, adding an additional clearance is one more place for things to go wrong, and 
thus decreases the chance of success.14 This is similar to the argument regarding policy 
formation that each additional veto player reduces the space of possible policy outcomes 
(Tsebelis 2002). 
Pressman, Wildavsky, and the responses just surveyed are examples of top-down 
models. The other dominant approach, has been bottom-up. Matland (1995: 146-148) 
explains that where top-down models “see implementation as concern with the degree to 
which the actions of implementing officials and target groups coincide with the goals 
embodied in an authoritative decision,” proponents of bottom-up models “argue that a 
more realistic understanding of implementation can be gained by looking at policy from 
the view of the target population and the service deliverers.” For example, Berman (1980: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Though it might be possible for the addition of an “easy win” to aid in a bandwagon 
effect or packaging of clearances. 
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206) argues, “A context-free theory of implementation is unlikely to produce a powerful 
explanation or accurate predictions” and that different situations will require different 
strategies. This suggests that understanding the problems with the Food Card will require 
looking at the politics in the particular municipalities where it was first implemented. 
Chapter 3 shows that, in the case of one of Zero Hunger’s pilot municipalities, this was 
indeed this case. 
For all the debates about which variables, out of hundreds, have explanatory 
power, there is at least one point of consensus: resources matter. O’Toole (2004: 317)) 
writes:  
The theoretical and empirical scholarship, virtually without exception, supports 
the propositions that more resources increase prospects of implementation success 
(almost no matter what one means by that latter notion); that resources are often 
not liquid, so that funding sometimes cannot be converted easily into (for 
instance) skilled staff, or vice versa; that therefore multiple kinds of resources 
may be critical; and that what matters for implementation is resources for the 
implementation tasks themselves, not simply size of budget or extent of subsidy 
to clients. 
 
While not a surprising finding, it means that resources should always be part of any 
implementation analysis. Returning to Bowen’s earlier point, additional resources can 
provide the opportunity to make multiple attempts at getting past a given step in the 
process or to package clearances together.  
 All of this suggests that the following is a useful approach to analyzing the 
implementation of a policy. First, consider how the resources allocated to a program 
compare with the mission assigned to it. Second, pay particular attention to the role of 
policy legacies, expecting that continuity with them, rather than a sharp break, should 
lead to a greater likelihood of success. Last, all else equal, a more complex program is 
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more likely to encounter problems, and one of the places programs can encounter 
complexity is in the specific context “on the ground.” 
 
Zero Hunger 	  
There are two Brazilian dissertations about Zero Hunger, both written a few years 
after the end of MESA, by authors with direct involvement with the program. 
Understanding their backgrounds is vital to understanding their perspectives.  
Takagi (2006) worked closely with Special Minister José Graziano at MESA, and 
he served as the second reader on her dissertation committee. Her dissertation, “The 
implementation of food security and nutrition policy in Brazil: its limits and 
challenges,”15 is a detailed account of Zero Hunger’s early years and she writes with the 
authority of someone deeply involved with MESA. However, this closeness also eclipses 
opportunities for constructive criticism.  
For Takagi, the proponents of food security policy ultimately “overcame the 
challenges to its implementation as a permanent policy in the country” (p. v, my 
translation). This is true, in that Brazil has an official framework for food security policy 
including participation from civil society through the National Nutrition and Food 
Security Council (CONSEA) and coordination between ministries through the 
Interministerial Chamber for Food Security and Nutrition (CAISAN). However, the 
approach ultimately taken differed greatly from that originally proposed. Her chapter on 
2003 does not provide a full explanation for why Lula replaced The Food Card with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Original Portuguese title: A Implantação da Política de Segurança Alimentar e 
Nutricional no Brasil: seus limites e desafios. 
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Bolsa Família and merged MESA into MDS. The conceptual framework from the 
literature just surveyed may be able to help explain why events played out as they did. 
Takagi also contends that it is necessary to take a “multi-sector” approach to food 
security policy, and one of the problems faced was an excessive division of policy into 
sectors (setorialização) and the use of a vertical structure (verticalização). However, as 
just discussed, one of the potential advantages of multiple independent initiatives aimed 
at a shared goal is that some can succeed while others fail. This is not to argue that there 
are not advantages to cooperation among sectors—indeed there may often be no viable 
alternative, but such coordination likely complicates policy and policymakers must take 
this into account. 
Gomes (2007) also writes as someone directly involved with Zero Hunger in its 
early stage. Having worked in food policy for decades, he agreed to serve in MESA but 
quickly left in frustration. He provides a detailed account of decades of food policy, and 
roots his analysis in a normative literature on basic human needs. His central claim is that 
the state has a duty to meet people’s basic needs and that these needs are inherently 
interconnected. In other words, it is impossible to separate them from each other. He 
criticizes the cash transfer approach for making people consumers, but not citizens.  
While I agree that the reality of the human condition means that basic needs are 
interconnected, I do not think this means that policies cannot target particular needs first. 
Take food and healthcare. Illness can lead to secondary malnutrition, meaning that even 
those with access to sufficient food may be malnourished. Similarly, if people only have 
access to healthcare but not enough food, going hungry will weaken their immune 
systems and limit the effectiveness of that care. Clearly, it would be absurd for the state 
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to make a goal of meeting some needs but not others. However, the reality of resource 
constraints and program implementation may mean that some needs are more easily met 
than others. So, from an administrative standpoint it may be useful to think of them as 
separate, even though this is not the actual lived reality. 
The most well known account of Zero Hunger in English is likely Hall’s (2006) 
article, “From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família: Social Policies and Poverty 
Alleviation under Lula.” He writes, “Fome Zero was in practice an umbrella programme 
for initiatives already developed under the FHC [Cardoso] administration” (694). While 
this ignores some of the new, smaller-scale initiatives, such as the Food Acquisition 
Program (PAA) which buys food from small producers and distributes it to the poor, the 
idea of an “umbrella program” is useful for understanding the program’s evolution, 
particularly after the end of MESA, and the term was also used in Brazilian media 
accounts.  
McCann (2008) describes things somewhat differently, writing, “Lula beat a hasty 
retreat from Fome Zero and invested in social programs similar to Cardoso’s, increasing 
their resources” (40). This agrees with Hall on the substance of ultimately deciding to 
build upon Cardoso’s policies, but is a sharp contrast in labeling.  
In his biography of Lula, Goertzel (2011) devotes an entire chapter to Zero 
Hunger and Bolsa Família. Regarding Zero Hunger in its first year, he writes that 
“Organizationally, it was a mess” (72) and that “In the case of food security programs, 
resolving the bureaucratic problems required reorganization to concentrate responsibility 
in the hands of a skilled administrator” (76), and hence the 2004 merger of MESA into 
the newly formed MDS. His account details shortcomings in Graziano’s leadership, 
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Graziano’s conflict with Frei Betto, the left-wing priest in charge of social mobilization, 
over what the program should look like, and the challenges of limited funding. I agree 
that poor leadership and limited funds were major problems with the program. The next 
chapter looks at this in greater detail, but it also explains why these are insufficient 
explanations for the program’s problems. Part of the reason that Zero Hunger was “a 
mess” was that it was a new, complicated program. 
 
Bolsa Família 	  
Chapters 4 and 5 look at Bolsa Família’s impact on poverty and hunger, 
respectively. What do we already know about how well the program works? First, 
research finds it to be largely immune to political manipulation. Fenwick (2009) argues 
that its success was due to the federal government “avoiding governors” and working 
directly with municipalities, thereby avoiding the corruption associated with the state 
level. She also tests the claim that Lula channeled funds for Bolsa Familia to particular 
regions for political reasons, finding that the allocation of funds almost exactly maps how 
money theoretically should be divided on the basis of need. In his data analysis Fried 
(2012) finds no evidence of political targeting. Sugiyama and Hunter (Forthcoming) 
conducted focus groups in communities with long legacies of clientelism and found that 
politicians did not use the benefit to buy votes. Second, the program is well targeted. An 
impact study for 2004 and 2006 found that just under sixty percent of benefits go to the 
poorest 20 percent of the population, and just over eighty percent went to the poorest 40 
percent ([Sergei] Soares 2012: 15). Likewise, Fábio Soares and colleagues (2010) also 
find the program to be well targeted. 
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None of this is surprising given the program’s design. Municipal social assistance 
officials interview applicants, but MDS officials in Brasilia process the applications and 
determine eligibility. MDS sets enrollment targets using an econometric model developed 
in partnership with the World Bank (Fried 2012). The actual transfer of money is the 
responsibility of Caixa, a large public bank that long precedes the Lula government 
(Lindert et al. 2007, Soares 2012).  
The program is programmatic and reaching the people it is intended to help. 
However, existing studies of Bolsa Família’s impact credit it with a first-order reduction 
of headcount poverty of under two percentage points, with similar results for extreme 
poverty. Sergei Soares (2012) writes:  
Bolsa Família has had a modest impact on poverty and even on extreme poverty, 
defined as the percentage of people living on less than the program’s eligibility 
levels. This should not be too surprising, since the values transferred are also 
quite modest. Equally modest are the number of studies addressing this issue, 
particularly when compared to the studies on inequality. 
 
He then remarks that he only knows of three studies on the question.  
Is this really all the program accomplished? Answering that question requires 
thinking carefully about (1) our concept of poverty and (2) how poverty measurements 
capture that concept. 
 
Poverty Measurement 	  
By far the most common way to measure poverty is headcount: how many people, 
or more often households, fall under a given threshold. This is the approach employed in 
the findings just cited. However, we have known for decades that headcount has some 
serious shortcomings. Here I discuss those shortcomings and alternative poverty 
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measures in general terms. Chapter 4 expands on this in greater detail, including the 
equations for each measure. This overview provides the necessary background to look at 
how these alternative measures have been applied to Bolsa Família. 
 Sen (1976) points out that with the headcount measure once someone is below 
the poverty line it does not matter how far below the line she falls. In short, there is no 
“partial credit.” On the other hand, headcount has the advantage of being easy to 
understand. In addition, one need not estimate a household’s precise income if it clearly 
falls well below the poverty line, which is an advantage since it can be difficult to report 
exact incomes for such households. 
Given that headcount fails to take account of a household’s distance to the 
poverty line, an alternative is to focus on this distance. This is the basis for the income 
gap measure, which expresses the average distance between poor households and the 
poverty line. However, this measure is unaffected by the number of households under the 
poverty line. The intensity measure combines the new measures by multiplying them 
together and thus responds to both the number of poor people and how poor they are. The 
problem with all of these measures is that they do not take into account the distribution of 
income among the poor. Among the various scenarios producing a given a number of 
poor people and a particular income gap, there are good reasons to prefer greater income 
equality among the poor (Sen 1983). A measure doing so is called an ordinal measure.16  
Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984, 2010) provide a way to express three of these 
measures in one equation. The equation includes a coefficient, alpha. By setting this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Not to be confused with an ordinal variable. 
 35	  
coefficient at 0, 1 or 2 it expresses the headcount, intensity, and ordinal measures, 
respectively. 
 
Impact on poverty 	  
Before looking at studies of Bolsa Família specifically, let us look at some of the 
broader literature on the impact of cash transfers on poverty. Barrientos and DeJong 
(2006) find that conditional cash transfers are effective at reducing child poverty. A study 
of Mexico’s Oportunidades found that, in 2004 “for the 25% poorest in Mexico, cash 
transfers can represent a significant share of total income” reaching a quarter of 
household income for the poorest (Zepeda 2006). Using the pre-transfer 25th income 
percentile as their poverty line, Fiszbein, Schady and colleagues (2009) find that cash 
transfers reduced headcount poverty by about 0.5 percentage point in Brazil, 2 percentage 
points in Ecuador, 1.1 percentage points in Jamaica, and 1.8 percentage points in Mexico, 
with stronger impact for income gap in all four countries.17 
We now turn to impact assessments of Bolsa Família’s role in reducing poverty. 
Soares and colleagues (2010) focus on headcount poverty.  They briefly discuss 
alternative poverty measures, writing that the headcount measure “is most relevant for 
moving society toward the eradication of poverty where the other two [income gap and 
ordinal] merely alleviate poverty, making it less harsh for those who remain poor” (my 
translation). Their study defines poverty and extreme poverty by Bolsa Família’s original 
eligibility lines from 2004, 100 and 50 reais per month, respectively, adjusted for 
inflation. A major contribution of their study is that it looks at the change over 1998 to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Their data for Brazil and Ecuador are from 2006 and their data for Mexico and Jamaica 
are from 2004. 
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2010 (this includes the cash transfers that preceded Bolsa Família), to demonstrate an 
increasing impact over time as coverage expands. Still, for 2009 they find a reduction of 
1.9 percentage points for poverty and 1.6 percentage points for extreme poverty.  
As part of a larger overview of the program, Soares and Sátyro (2009) look at all 
three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measures, again using the eligibility requirements as a 
poverty line. As expected, they find greater impacts for the other measures, with an 
eighteen percent (not percentage point) reduction in the intensity measure and a twenty-
two percent reduction in the ordinal measure.  
Rocha (2008) uses twenty-five poverty lines in order to account for regional 
differences in the cost of living. Her values range from 62.47 reais in the rural northeast 
to 250.79 reais in metropolitan São Paulo. She explains that this means it is impossible 
for Bolsa Família to bring an urban household out of poverty. This comes down to simple 
arithmetic: if a family has an income low enough to qualify for the benefit, there is no 
scenario where the benefit will be enough to bring the family across this higher urban 
poverty line. Like the other studies, her simulations of what 2004 would look like without 
the program find a modest impact on headcount poverty, with no reduction in urban and 
metropolitan areas and only about a two percentage-point reduction for rural areas. This 
is probably partly because Brazil was still in the process of expanding coverage of Bolsa 
Família. She also presents Foster-Greer-Thorbecke’s intensity and ordinal measures, and 
these again show a greater impact. Of the three studies, hers is the only one to break 
down the impact on poverty by region and to compare rural and urban rates.  
None of the three studies reports the income gap ratio by itself. As Brady (2003) 
argues, the use of headcount, income gap ratio, and intensity measures together provides 
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insights they cannot accomplish alone. None of these studies applies alternative measures 
to examine the impact of Bolsa Família on extreme poverty. Since households in extreme 
poverty receive more money than those in poverty and the extreme poverty threshold is 
lower, we should expect a greater impact. Chapter 4 shows this to be the case. 
 
The impact of cash transfers on hunger 	  
What is already known about the impact of conditional cash transfers on hunger? 
Hoddinott and Bassett (2009:16) conclude that they “can have a positive and sizable 
effect on preschool nutritional status” but “outcomes are mixed,” finding evidence of 
success in Mexico’s PROGRESSA and Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social but not 
Honduras’s Programa de Asignación Familiar or Brazil’s Food Allowance (the Ministry 
of Health transfer dating to Cardoso, not to be confused with Zero Hunger’s Food Card). 
Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) find that PROGRESSA both increased calories program 
recipients consumed and the quality of the food they consumed, as compared to similar 
non-beneficiaries. Behrman and Hoddinott (2001) find that the program improved child 
nutrition, as measured by height. 
Morris and colleagues (2004) find that the Food Allowance—again, not to be 
confused with MESA’s Food Card—was “associated with a small reduction in the rate of 
weight gain of preschool children in Northeast Brazil.” Their control group was 
“excluded as a result of quasi-random administrative errors.” In explaining why those 
receiving Food Allowance would be more likely to have underweight children they write: 
…we are inclined to attribute the small negative impact on children’s weight gain 
to an incentive effect: mothers may have believed that their participation in the 
program was due to their child being underweight and that the benefits would be 
suspended should the child start to grow well. This rule was once enforced in a 
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Brazilian federal program called Incentivo para o Combate de Carências 
Nutricionais, which made milk powder available to mothers of underweight 
children. Many (probably the majority) of the mothers in our sample had 
previously been beneficiaries of this program, and there have been anecdotal—
and impossible to substantiate—reports of beneficiary mothers deliberately 
keeping their children malnourished to qualify for the benefits (2340). 
 
Of course the anecdotal reports are equally impossible to refute. Even if, due to legacies 
from previous nutritional policies, this was what happened in this particular case, the 
authors point out that:  
…our findings only apply to the 4 pilot municipalities studied and may not have 
been replicated in the expansion phase of the program. In fact, it is very likely that 
families’ concerns about being suspended from the program will have diminished 
over the course of 2003, because it became obvious that mass suspensions were 
not occurring (2341). 
 
They also note that their previous research found an increase in food consumption 
associated with Food Allowance. 
Paes-Sousa and Santos (2009) analyze data from participants in four of Brazil’s 
Health and Nutrition Days. In contrast with Morris and colleagues, they find that 
“children whose family received the PBF [Programa Bolsa Família] benefit were 26% 
more likely to have an appropriate height/age than those from non-beneficiary families, 
and that the same difference also applied to weight/age.” Given Brazil’s large size and 
the great differences between regions, it would be useful to also look at nationally 
representative data. 
Instead of looking at outcomes, like underweight children, another approach is to 
look at access to food. The term for this is “food security.” Segall-Correa and colleagues 
(2008) analyze the 2004 Brazilian Household Sample Survey (PNAD) and find “….an 
increased chance of food security of 8% per each R$ 10.00 contributed by social 
programs (40).” They use a stepwise regression to analyze cross-sectional data. In the 
 39	  
stepwise approach the statistical software estimates a series of models until it finds the 
one which best fits the data. Maximizing model fit comes with some tradeoffs, however. 
Judd, McClelland and Ryan (2009: 125-126) level three criticisms against this 
approach18: 
First, an unfocused search through many possible models (sometimes pejoratively 
referred to as a “fishing expedition”) increases the likelihood of capitalizing on 
chance (i.e. making Type I errors)…Second, as we learned in this chapter, the 
interpretation of the coefficients and the meaning of the questions being asked 
depend on what other variables are included in the model…Third, it is our 
experience and strong belief that better models and a better understanding of 
one’s data result from focused data analysis, guided by substantive theory. 
 
The Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE 2008) conducted 
an in depth study of recipients, and found that the average household receiving Bolsa 
Família spent R$ 200 (about $90) on food per month (p. 45) and that the average family 
received R$ 71.60 (about $32), making the average transfer equivalent to about a third of 
the average food budget. Over 80% of households used their benefit to buy food, making 
it the most common category of expenditure in the study. 
The balance of these studies suggests that Bolsa Família had an impact on food 
security. Given the difficulty in measuring hunger and the limited available data, every 
study will employ tradeoffs of some kind. One of the problems with any cross-sectional 
approach is that if a transfer is both (1) targeted well at people more likely to be hungry 
and (2) effective at reducing hunger, it should be positively correlated with hunger in a 
given moment but negatively correlated with hunger over time. Thus a study employing 
observations from more than one time point would be useful. Chapter 5 pursues such an 
approach to analyzing food security data. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Stribney (1998) for more discussion.  
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Conclusion  	  
Taken together, the discussion above points at the following hypotheses. First, a 
new policy that builds on policy legacies will be more likely to be successful than one 
that does not. Second, a simpler policy will be more likely to succeed than a complex 
one. Third, Bolsa Família made a more significant reduction in the intensity measure of 
extreme poverty than headcount. Fourth, this reduction led to a reduction in food 
insecurity over time. Chapter 3 looks at the first two hypotheses
	   
CHAPTER 3: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
Introduction 	  
 This chapter takes on the “why these policies?” question. The previous chapter 
outlined why we should expect a policy to be more successful if it builds upon policy 
legacies and employs a simple design. This chapter will test those hypotheses through a 
detailed process tracing of Zero Hunger’s development in 2003.  
 
Background 	  
 Zero Hunger was initially popular, with a March 2003 poll finding that 72% of 
Brazilians had a positive image of the program.19 In April 2003, Folha reported, “4,500 
people visit Zero Hunger’s website daily, 200 of them send emails asking to volunteer. 
Between March 14 and April 9, the information center received 131,728 calls.”20 
Numerous groups donated, or tried to donate, food to the program, as detailed below. 
 Celebrities, including soccer players Ronaldo and Kaká, Argentine NBA player 
Emanuel Ginóbili, and musicians from Gilberto Gil to Pavarotti to The Chemical 
Brothers worked to raise funds and publicize the program.21 The music label 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 “Mesmo Insatisfeito, Lula Vai Manter Graziano No Governo.” March, 14 2003. Folha 
de São Paulo.  
 
20 Marta Salomon, and Gabriela Athias. April 13, 2003. “Com Programa Único, Lula 
Prepara Guinada No Social.” Folha de São Paulo. 
 
21 Bergamo, Monica. January, 25 2003. “Lula Chama Ronaldo Para Lançar Fome Zero.” 
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Universidade released a CD with the official Zero Hunger anthem in May 2004, which 
included Gil, Jorge Bem Jor, and others.22 Pope John Paul II urged everyone to support 
the program and support also came from the business sector, including banks, Nestlé, and 
Coca-Cola.23 In addition, Duda Mendonça, one of best campaign managers in Brazil and 
the architect of Lula’s successful 2002 campaign (McCann 2008: 38), did free publicity 
for the program.24 
 In Lula’s inauguration speech he had emphasized land reform as one of the keys 
to ending hunger in Brazil (da Silva 2003). However, even if successful, the changes 
necessary to create that kind of structural change would take time, so the emergency 
measures would have to come first. MESA’s major policy initiative was the Food Card, 
modeled after the U.S. food stamp program. There were three major federal cash transfer 
programs in Brazil: School Allowance, Food Allowance, and Gas Allowance (Soares 
2012). The Food Card would be different because it could only be used to buy food, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Folha de São Paulo; “Jogador Quer Participar Do Fome Zero.” February 4, 2003. Folha 
de São Paulo; “Jogador Da NBA Quer Participar Do Fome Zero.” March 31, 2003. Folha 
de São Paulo; Fernandes, Kamila. March 21, 2003. “‘Tele Fome Zero’ Vai Arrecadar 
Fundos Pele TV.” Folha de São Paulo; “Pavarotti Traz Evento Beneficente a São Paulo.” 
October 12, 2004. Folha de São Paulo; “Eletrônica.” Septermber 15, 2004. Folha de São 
Paulo. 
 
22 “Universidade Lança CD Com Hino Do Fome Zero.” May 4, 2004. Folha de São 
Paulo. 
 
23 Terpins, Jack. June 27, 2003. “A Comunidade Judaica e o Fome Zero.” Folha de São 
Paulo; Spinelli, Evandro. January 26, 2003. “Doação Ao Fome Zero Serve de Vitrine.” 
Folha de São Paulo. “Febraban Oferece Ajuda a Fome Zero.” February 7, 2003. Folha de 
São Paulo; “Governo Oferece Vitrine Aos Colaboradores Do Fome Zero.” October 28, 
2003. Folha de São Paulo. 
 
24 Cantanhêde, Eliane. March 18, 2003. “Fome Zero ‘Toma’ Ações Já Realizadas Por 
Outras Pastas.” Folha de São Paulo. Dantas, Iuri. March 30, 2003. “Governo Descobre 
Tentativa de Fraude Do Fome Zero No ED.” Folha de São Paulo. 
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because civil society, through municipal level Management Committees (comites 
gestores), would be charged with selecting recipients. 
 Many things went wrong in the first year. There was confusion, and disagreement 
within government, regarding many basic details of the program. What would be the 
relationship between the new special ministry and existing programs? Would people be 
given food, income to buy food, or both? Would they be required to spend that money on 
food, or could they use it for other basic needs? What form would participation “from 
society” take? How would the program decide which states, municipalities, and 
individuals to help first? Partially due to this confusion, the Food Card expanded slowly. 
All of this led to relentless criticism in the media, as well as from inside the Workers’ 
Party (PT) and from members of its coalition. 
 The announcement of Bolsa Família came in September 2003, followed by 
MESA’s merger into MDS in January 2004 and the start of the “umbrella” approach to 
Zero Hunger. How, within a matter of months, did policy move from promising a “new 
economic model” to an approach that looked fairly similar to that of the previous 
government? Why did a program with widespread public and international support 
encounter so many problems?  
 This chapter focuses on the move from MESA to MDS and from the Food Card to 
Bolsa Família. It argues that this evolution reveals how a lack of continuity with previous 
policies and an excess of complexity both contributed to the failure of Zero Hunger under 
MESA. In contrast to the Food Card, Bolsa Família used a simpler design and built on 
legacies from the previous government, leading it to become the largest conditional cash 
transfer in the world.  
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Alternative Explanations 	  
 Two common explanations for the failure of the MESA approach are lack of 
funding and poor management. While important, they are insufficient. 
 
Resource Constraints 	  
 Early media reports presented lack of funding as a major obstacle to the 
program.25 Lula’s “Letter to the Brazilian People” had committed to maintaining the 
basic contours of Cardoso’s macro-economic policies, including balanced budgets, which 
limited funds for new social programs (da Silva 2002). Thus it is reasonable to wonder if 
a limited funds explain the move to a less ambitious approach in combatting hunger. 
 This is part of the story. All programs cost money and ambitious policies usually 
cost a lot of money.26 A government can get all the other pieces right—good policy 
design, solid leadership, and effective organization—and have it all be for naught without 
sufficient funding. Simply put, there was no way anything like what was proposed in 
2001 and promised in Lula’s inauguration speech could have been achieved with the 
funds allocated in 2003. MESA’s budget at the start of the year was 1.8 billion reais 
(Takagi 2011: 56). With a population of nearly 200 million people, this amounts to about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “Fome Zero Precisa de R$ 5 Bi, Mas Orçamento Prevê Apenas R$ 1,8 Bi.” January 13, 
2003. Folha de São Paulo; Natali, João Batista. January 20, 2003. “Fome Zero Esbarra 
Na Falta de Pessoal e No Baixo Orçamento.” Folha de São Paulo.  
 
26 As mentioned in Chapter 2, scholars who study implementation are in agreement about 
this 
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US$ 2.50 per capita for the year. The 2001 proposal aimed to help about a quarter of the 
Brazilian population (Citizenship Institute 2001: 19). At 2003 exchange rates this 
amounts to roughly ten U.S. dollars for each person in the target population for the entire 
year.  
 However, Zero Hunger did not even spend all the money budgeted to it. The Fund 
to Combat and Eradicate Poverty, which fell under Zero Hunger, had over a billion reais 
unspent at the end of the year.27 Clóvis Rossi was scathing in an end of the year 
retrospective: 
If someone does not have the money to fulfill a promise, that’s understandable. 
There’s a shortage of everything in Brazil (except, of course, for the sacred interest on 
the debt). But when, having money, the government was unable to spend it all, this is 
already a scandal, a demonstration of unparalleled incompetence.28  
 
Clearly there is more to the story than just the limited budget. 
 Not even spending the money allocated to it suggests problems with the 
program’s leadership. Special Minister José Graziano’s only major experience in 
government was nine months working for the state of Rio de Janeiro.29 Of course, lack of 
experience in government does not mean someone will be ineffective in government, as 
Lula’s example itself illustrates, though Lula’s history as a trade unionist and PT 
candidate doubtless taught him valuable leadership skills. In contrast to Lula’s ability to 
learn on the job, Graziano did not prove himself equal to the task of managing the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Salomon, Marta. December 25, 2003. “Doações Para o Fome Zero Ajudam a Pagar 
Superávit.” Folha de São Paulo. For MESA’s response and Salomon’s reply see “Painel 
de Leitor.” December 29, 2009. Folha de São Paulo 
 
28 Rossi, Clóvis. December, 26 2003. “Fome de Competência.” Folha de São Paulo. 
 
29 “Curto-circuito Social.” March 15, 2003. Folha de São Paulo. 
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government’s flagship program. While he made a number of missteps resulting in bad 
press, here we look at two of the biggest. 
 In late January 2003, Brazilian model Gisele Bündchen decided to donate part of 
her earnings from São Paulo Fashion week to Zero Hunger and MESA expressed its 
thanks.30 Later, in an interview, Frei Betto was unaware that bank accounts had been 
opened for donations to the program over a month before at Caixa and Banco do Brasil, 
something the person coordinating public participation could reasonably be expected to 
know.31 In the end, it took about six weeks for MESA to deposit the check into one of its 
accounts.32  
 Probably the most infamous news story was Graziano’s poorly worded comment 
about people from the northeast.33 At a speech at the Federation of Industry in São Paulo 
(FIESP) he said, “We have to create work there [in the Northeast], because, if they keep 
coming here, we’re going to have to drive around in bullet-proof cars.”34 Note the 
undertones of class and region that can be read into this sentence. Here we have a white 
university professor from the Brazil’s largest city, in the wealthier South, talking about 
people from the much poorer Northeast as “them” and painting “them” as prone to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Zorzan, Patricia and Ivan Finotti. January 28, 2003. “Gisele Doa Parte de Seu Cache 
Ao Projeto Fome Zero.” Folha de São Paulo. 
 
31 “Frei Betto Não Sabia Sobre Contas Para Doação.” March 13, 2003. Folha de São 
Paulo. 
 
32 “Governo Recebe Doação de Gisele.” March 20, 2003. Folha de São Paulo. 
 
33 “Graziano Pede Desculpas Aos Nordestinos.” March 27, 2003. Folha de São Paulo. 
 
34 “Temos de criar emprego lá…porque, se eles continuarem vindo pra cá, vamos ter de 
continuar andando de carro blindado.” 
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violence. This is almost certainly not what he meant by the comment, but opponents took 
the opportunity to interpret it this way. The comment led to protests and an apology.35 
 
Leadership 	  
 It is tempting to lay responsibility for all of Zero Hunger’s problems at Graziano’s 
feet. After all, it was his job to make sure Zero Hunger used resources budgeted to it, to 
run an effective operation, and to avoid saying or doing things that would earn negative 
media coverage. Two months into the government Eliane Cantanhêde remarked, “The 
program, which everyone imagined was ready, detailed, and with a defined team, was 
none of this.”36 The program was largely his idea, and these failings fall in great part to 
him. 
 Graziano was close friends with President Lula, as had been his father. In 
interviews this was a recurring explanation for his appointment.37 By early March there 
were already conversations about replacing Graziano, with some advocating Abílio 
Diniz, head of the grocery chain Pão de Azucar.38 Lula’s response was unambiguous: 
“Graziano works with me for 22 years, never took salary, and lost four elections at my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 “Ministro É Chamado de ‘Marginal’.” April 16, 2003. Folha de São Paulo; “Graziano 
Pede Desculpas Aos Nordestinos.” March 27, 2003. Folha de São Paulo. 
 
36 Cantanhêde, Eliane. March 9, 2003. “Zero a Zero.” Folha de São Paulo. 
 
37 Interview with: Newton Naciso Gomes Junior. Former MESA employee. Professor of 
social work at the University of Brasilia. February 24, 2011; Ana Fonseca. Former head 
of Bola Família. April 15, 2011. Brasília; Cristovam Buaruqe. Federal Senator for the 
Federal District. June 29, 2011. Brasília. 
 
38 Cantanhêde, Eliane. March 13, 2003. “Fome e Vontade de Comer.” Folha de São 
Paulo. 
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side. You’re asking me to replace him after two months?”39 Though he was unhappy with 
the progress made, Lula felt obligated by loyalty to keep Graziano in the position. 
 Sometimes people hire their under-qualified friends and sometimes those friends 
perform poorly. We already know this, and the performance of U.S. Federal Emergency 
Management Administration head Michael Brown during Hurricane Katrina easily 
illustrates that this problem is not isolated to Brazil. So one general takeaway point is: if 
you have just come to power in a historic election promising major change, it would be 
good to think twice before placing an inexperienced friend in charge of your major new 
initiative. 
 Be that as it may, the personal relationship between Lula and Graziano is not very 
helpful for understanding the politics of anti-hunger policy. Graziano’s friendship with 
Lula explains why he got to try out his ideas, not why many of those ideas were 
unsuccessful. The latter potentially provides knowledge about social policy applicable 
beyond this one place and time. 
 
The Argument 	  
 A key reason Zero Hunger went so poorly in its first year is that it insisted on 
building new policies in areas where policies already existed and made anti-hunger policy 
much more complicated than it needed to be. As a programatic leftist party, it is not 
surprising that the PT wanted to combat hunger and extreme poverty. However, in 
hindsight, some of the specific decisions made during the first year of Zero Hunger are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 “Mesmo Insatisfeito, Lula Vai Manter Graziano No Governo.” March 14, 2003. Folha 
de São Paulo. 
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surprising. This is in part because the Zero Hunger strategy represents a particular left-
wing ideology. Frei Betto claimed in January 2003, “In Zero Hunger we don’t have 
dogmas. We’re learning with those who already worked in food security.”40 However, for 
all their talk of learning-as-you-go, again and again those in charge Zero Hunger acted as 
though they already knew the correct answer to a policy question. 
 Just as important as what they proposed doing is how they proposed to do it. Even 
if one agrees that the problem of hunger should be prioritized and that many of the 
policies proposed in 2001 and attempted in 2003 are appropriate to address the problem, 
that still leaves plenty of room to disagree about the specifics of carrying them out. 
Clearly, what MESA tried to do—give money to the poorest people so they could buy 
food—was neither novel nor radical, but the approach it took to doing this sought to be 
both these things. This commitment led to the failure of the Food Card. 
 One key part of the ideology governing Zero Hunger in 2003 is that combatting 
hunger requires a sharp break with the status quo instead of a gradual shifting of 
priorities, a “new economic development model” (Citizenship Institute 2001: 17). In his 
preface to the 2001 proposal Lula even went so far as to say that ending hunger required 
a “true revolution” (da Silva 2001: 13). The authors of the proposal claimed “Brazil lacks 
a National Food Security Policy today…” because President Cardoso’s policies were 
“…of a merely localized nature and usually intended to supplement the income of poor 
families at levels that are not sufficient to eliminate hunger” (Citizenship Institute 2001: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Gerchmann, Léo. January 28, 2003. “Fome Zero Testará a Distribuição de Cupons e de 
Dinheiro No Piauí.” Folha de São Paulo. 
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18). Given this, it comes as no surprise that MESA’s focus was on making new policies 
instead of building on those already in place. 
 A second key belief is that complex inter-connected problems require complex 
inter-connected solutions. After outlining the kinds of policies necessary, the authors 
remark, “none of them can, isolatedly [sic], tackle the hunger issue, much less ensure 
food security to the population” (Citizenship Institute 2001: 21). Given that the proposal 
defines food security in terms of both quantity and quality of food (18), it is certainly true 
that no single policy can achieve this goal. However, this does not mean that those 
policies must be implemented in an inter-connected fashion. In the language of 
restaurants, the decision to serve up a set of policies does not mean that they must be 
offered as a combo meal. There are reasons to consider an a la carte approach that leaves 
their implementation largely independent of each other, but allows their benefits to 
compliment each other. 
 
Research Design 	  
 Both in theory and in practice Zero Hunger went beyond cash transfers, and the 
overall conversation about anti-hunger policy in Brazil must look at agrarian 
development policies, too. However, the Food Card received two thirds of MESA’s 
budget, 1.2 billion reais (Takagi 2011: 56). Given that structural policies take longer to 
implement, it is natural that the emergency policies came first and also received the most 
public attention. Ansell (2007) remarks that people spoke of Zero Hunger arriving to a 
municipality when the Food Card arrived there, even if the complementary development 
initiatives had not. 
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 The Food Card and Bolsa Família provide an opportunity to compare two policies 
with the same immediate objective of increasing income through cash transfers so that 
the poor can buy food. They are both policies of the Lula Government and both carried 
out around the same time. The Food Card only reached 1.9 million households by the end 
of 2003 (Takagi 2011: 68), where Bolsa Família hit 6.5 million households in 2004 and 
nearly 11 million households by the end of Lula’s term in 2006 (IPEA 2013). In my 
experience even many Brazilians and scholars of Brazil do not recall the Food Card, 
where Bolsa Família is known worldwide. 
This chapter looks at a series of key decisions during the first year of the Lula 
government regarding emergency programs designed to combat hunger. The evidence, 
taken from media reports, government documents, secondary scholarly literature, and 
interviews, largely supports my claim that lack of continuity with existing policies and 
excess complexity in program design were major contributors to the Food Card and 
MESA, giving way to Bolsa Família and MDS. In the next sections I look at some of 
those key decisions. 
 
MESA 	  
 For Zero Hunger the first key decision was to create a special ministry in charge 
of food security as recommended in the 2001 proposal (Citizenship Institute 2001: 36-
37). Lula’s transition team had recommended that Lula break with the “fragmented 
structure” of social policy right away, but instead Lula sided with Graziano in creating 
MESA.41 This established the framework under which Zero Hunger operated in its first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Salomon, Marta. April 9, 2003. “Fome Zero Engasga e Área Social, Desordenada, 
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year. The decision to structure policy this way is a prime example of both the desire to 
make new, fresh policy and of taking a complicated approach to doing so.  
 Shortly after MESA’s formation, Bishop Maruo Morelli, a longtime anti-hunger 
advocate and member of the National Council on Food and Nutrition Security 
(CONSEA), argued that MESA should be “an organ for planning, not a center of 
autonomous projects,”42 but the approach it took was precisely the latter. Indeed, Maya 
Tagaki, who worked in MESA and later served as the Secretary for Food Security in the 
Ministry of Social Development in the Dilma Rousseff government, held this up as one 
of its principal successes.43 In early 2004 Morelli reflected back on the previous year, 
saying, “To create a ministry for hunger is to embark, at a minimum, on a disastrous 
error.”44 The events of 2003 suggest it was not an effective organizational structure, 
consistent with this dissertation’s expectations. 
 In March 2003, Senator Pedro Simon (Rio Grande do Sul) made the following 
criticism: 
Lula’s government created so many organs—29—that, in some form, making them 
function is not easy. In other words: the problem of hunger is Graziano’s, social 
problems are Minister [of Social Assistance] Bendida da Silva’s. But hunger is a 
social problem. The problems of cities are minister Olívio Dutra’s. But there’s hunger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Patina.” Folha de São Paulo. Interview with Ana Fonseca April 15, 2011 Brasília. 
 
42 Tortato, Mari. February 8, 2003. “D. Mauro Volta a Criticar Fome Zero.” Folha de São 
Paulo. 
 
43 Interview with Maya Takagi. Former MESA official, Secretary for Food Security in 
MDS. March 25, 2011. Brasília. 
 
44 Guibu, Fábio. March 20, 2004. “D. Mauro Ataca o Fome Zero e a Política 
Econômica.” Folha de São Paulo. 
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in the city. So, it creates a tangled mess where no one knows where one ends and the 
other begins. It’s really difficult.45 
 
Simon was from The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), part of Lula’s 
coalition. There were similar criticisms within Lula’s own party. At a meeting of PT 
federal deputies both Tarcísio Zimmermann (Rio Grande do Sul) and Terezinha 
Fernandes (Maranhão) made the same point, with Fernandes stating, “With our 
government policy became even more fragmented. We have social policy in Health, 
Education, and now in Food Security.”46 This recalls Weyland’s (1996) argument about 
fragmentation undermining reform. 
 MESA’s primary initiatives duplicated policies already underway in other parts of 
the federal government. One of the three federal cash transfer programs, The Ministry of 
Health’s Food Allowance, was aimed specifically at fighting hunger. The Ministry of 
Agrarian Development (MDA) was responsible for supporting family farmers, with The 
National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) responsible for land 
reform.47 It is easy to see why economist Marcelo Néri concluded “now we’re 
reinventing the wheel.”48  
 With multiple ministries responsible for the same areas, the turf battles that 
followed ought to come as no surprise. Indeed, the rivalry between Minister of Health 
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José Serra and Minister of Education Paulo Renato Souza, both presidential hopefuls, had 
kept the cash transfer programs from being unified under President Cardoso.49 On 
January 20, 2003 Folha reported that Minister of Social Assistance Benedita da Silva 
called for centralizing all social programs, including Zero Hunger, under her ministry.50 
The same day it also reported that Graziano’s team wanted School Allowance and Food 
Allowance to fall under their jurisdiction51 The concerns about fragmentation were well 
founded. 
 Fragmentation of authority, and the ensuing complexity, extended to Zero 
Hunger’s internal politics as well, with Graziano and Betto often appearing to be reading 
from different scripts. Early reports had Graziano announcing that Zero Hunger had 
forty-one separate actions52 while Frei Betto put the number at twenty-five.53 Stating that 
he felt ignored and could be more effective outside of government, Grajew, who had been 
responsible for coordinating with businesses, left MESA in November 2003.54 Betto 
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(2010) complained of an excess of time, effort, and money spent on publicity instead of 
programing.55 
 By mid-March the PT's National Directorate was calling for Zero Hunger to move 
faster, stating in a resolution "…the program needs to better define its focus, its 
instruments of implementation, and the criteria for evaluation of results."56 Around the 
same time there were discussions of making Zero Hunger an “umbrella” program.57 It 
took until the end of the year to move to this approach. 
 Did the end of MESA mean that Zero Hunger had failed? Senator José Agripino 
of Rio Grande do Norte, from the opposition Liberal Front Party (PFL) thought that it 
did, stating, “If a team is working, you don’t change anything. If the President changed 
something, it’s because the program wasn’t going well.”58  
 MDS is a simpler structure than a ministry in charge of social assistance, a special 
ministry in charge of food security, and a secretariat in charge of cash transfers. The 
approach also marks a shift back towards the division of responsibility under Cardoso, 
instead of having a new ministry implementing new policies in these same areas.  
 With this understanding of how the decisions regarding institutional structure fit 
my argument, we now look at the decisions MESA made regarding emergency anti-
hunger programs.   	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Food vs. Income 	  
 The argument framing the 2001 proposal was that Brazil needed the short-term 
emergency programs to help people in dire need while the structural programs got 
underway. In the language of an expression popular in both Brazil and the U.S., you need 
to give a man a fish to keep him from starving until you have taught him to catch his own 
fish. 
 The two main approaches to emergency anti-hunger efforts are giving people food 
and increasing people’s incomes so they can buy more food. MESA tried to do both 
simultaneously. Cardoso had abolished distribution of baskets in 2000,59 replacing them 
with cash transfers (Graziano da Silva, Belik and Takagi 2011: 45). The decision to make 
direct food benefits part of Zero Hunger was a break with this. Efforts to collect 
donations replicated and competed with existing efforts by civil society. All of this made 
for a much more complicated program and contributed to confusion about Zero Hunger’s 
goals and the means by which it hoped to achieve them. 
 
Baskets 	  
 The 2001 proposal for Zero Hunger generally opposed the use of baskets, arguing 
that baskets of food should be used only in situations where no other alternative exists, 
such as emergencies and people newly settled by land reform (Citizenship Institute 2001: 
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28). Yet, about halfway through 2003 Folha reported that the government had spent more 
on baskets than the food card.60 
 Even though Graziano had explicitly prohibited them from doing so, Zero Hunger 
in Piauí still gave out baskets.61 While the program touted the merits of a partnership 
between federal, state, and municipal governments, this is a prime example of the kind of 
problems such an approach can have and the complexity of coordinating these different 
levels of government. 
 MESA announced that at the end of April it would start distributing baskets to 
63,000 people in isolated communities.62 In one sense this is not a reversal, as the 
position had always been that baskets can be necessary for particular communities. 
However, this broke with the previous government and required them to re-create what 
former “Secretary of Drought” Orlando Muniz called a “very complex” program.63 It was 
also a very difficult program to carry out. Athias writes: 
“An ex-director of CONAB [Brazilian National Food Supply Company], who asked 
not to be identified, told Folha that distributing baskets in the most remote regions of 
the country was a ‘war operation.’ The baskets ‘travel’ [viajam] up to 40 days to 
reach their final destination, and many times arrive late.”64  	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In sum, baskets were complicated, difficult, and a sharp break with the previous 
government’s policy.  
 
Donations 	  
 In addition to the baskets there were campaigns for public food donations. The 
2001 proposal for Zero Hunger called for participation of all parts of society and in early 
2003 many Brazilians responded to the call, with food donations being a major form of 
support. Unfortunately, the program was ill-prepared to receive and organize this support. 
 For example, in January 2003 Zero Hunger received 2.5 (metric) tons from a 
group of 60 van drivers in Rio de Janeiro.65 Many such groups participated, and by mid-
March this added up to 40 tons from business groups and trade unions.66 The immediate 
problem was getting the donations to the people who needed them. 
 MESA announced in late January that municipal governments and civil society 
would be in charge of distributing the donations.67 However, the confusion continued. In 
early March Gabriela Athias reported “The federal government is asking for food 
donations for Zero Hunger, but it still doesn’t have a structure to receive and store large 
shipments.”68 	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 July 2003 marked the launch of the NGO called Support Zero Hunger (Apoio 
Fome Zero) headed by Brazil’s first lady, Marisa Letícia Lula da Silva.69 Its role was to 
coordinate businesses and civil society support for the government’s efforts. This again 
represents Zero Hunger starting from scratch instead of building on existing legacies, as 
Brazil already had a major NGO dedicated to fighting hunger. In 1993 sociologist 
Herbert de Souza had created Brazil’s primary anti-hunger group, Citizenship Action 
Against Hunger and Misery, and for Life, responsible for Brazil’s annual Christmas 
Without Hunger donation campaign70 
 On the one hand, Zero Hunger contrasted its approach to such charity campaigns. 
Walter Belik, an economist and co-author of the 2001 proposal, said that Zero Hunger “is 
not a donation campaign, it is not a ‘Christmas without hunger’ for four years.”71 It may 
not have intended to be Christmas Without Hunger, but it ended up competing with that 
program, with Citizen Action reporting a 31% decrease in food donations.72 The donation 
campaigns clearly duplicated existing efforts in civil society.  
  Being involved in donations carries a clear opportunity cost. Commentator Carlos 
Cony complained about “the loss of energy and time from a government that ought to 
combat hunger and misery with reforms that only the state can do, leaving charity for the 	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charitable.”73 The coordinator for Christmas Without Hunger, Maurício Andrade agreed, 
saying that his NGO’s charitable donations were incapable of ending hunger and that the 
state needed to focus on making public policy.74  
 The early distribution of food was key for defining Zero Hunger in the public eye. 
It makes sense that, when asked to participate in a campaign against hunger, many 
Brazilians would think of collecting food as the way they could participate. There was a 
long history of giving food directly to the poor, and the new ministry dedicated to leading 
the campaign against hunger seemed a natural focus point to organize these efforts. 
 In calling for the public to take action but not clearly outlining suggested actions 
that would not outstrip their small new ministry’s capacity, MESA created a lose-lose 
situation for itself: not accepting and effectively using the food donations—or even 
discussing auctioning them75—looks bad, but incorporating them into the program diverts 
resources from the approach it was trying to take. The food donations approach also 
reinforces the understanding of hunger Zero Hunger sought to correct: that hunger was 
about there not being enough food available or needing to move food to a different part of 
Brazil.  
 Given these limitations, an obvious choice was a simple message from the start 
that MESA and the federal government were not interested in receiving food donations. 
Local governments and civil society would of course be welcome to collect and distribute 	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donations as part of the nation-wide effort, without involving MESA. Ultimately this was 
the approach taken, but this coming as a change in policy makes it look like failure, 
where if MESA had done this from beginning it might have avoided the entire problem.  
 
Stamps vs. Cash 	  
 The existing approach to income support was cash transfers, such as the Ministry of 
Health’s Food Allowance and the Ministry of Education’s School Allowance. The 2001 
plan proposed a new food stamp program as Zero Hunger’s primary emergency program, 
arguing that a coupon program could be “massive” without causing inflation because it 
could stimulate local production (Citizenship Institute 2001: 26). Stamps were to only be 
used to buy unprepared food, and not alcohol, fast food, or sweets. The supermarket, 
store, or farmers’ market would need to be registered in order to participate, with the use 
of an electronic card or paper coupons depending on the location. The coupons were to be 
independent of cash transfers and pensions, to require participation in self-improvement 
programs such as literacy and job training, and to be subject to renewal every 6-12 
months (Citizenship Institute 2001: 26).  The plan called for gradual implementation, 
starting with pilot programs in areas of the Northeast hit by drought (27). A key reason 
for the preference for a food stamp was to connect the emergency measure to the larger 
project stimulating economic growth. The idea was that forcing recipients to purchase 
food would channel funds towards local producers, who would receive support from the 
structural parts of the program. Producers would, in turn, spend their new income, and so 
forth.  
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 As Special Minister for Food Security, Graziano remained doggedly committed to 
the food stamp idea. Walter Belik, one of the authors of the 2001 proposal, argued that 
the government had no desire to weaken or end existing social programs.76 Indeed, the 
original proposal called for expanding cash transfers in addition to creating the Food 
Card (Citizenship Institute 2001: 25). Nevertheless, the Food Card represented a choice 
to put money energy into a new program instead of expanding into the existing ones. This 
allowed them attempt to contrast the new program with the old, but came at the cost of 
being much harder to implement. 
 Key figures in the PT advocated expanding cash transfers instead of creating a 
food stamp. Cristovam Buarque, who started the School Allowance program in the 
Federal District when he was governor, was at this point serving as Minister of 
Education. He argued that it would be better to simply increase the size of the federal 
School Allowance payments, since the program already reached 5.5 million families.77 
When I interviewed him in 2011 (at which point he was a Federal Senator and had left 
the PT for the Brazilian Labor Party [PDT]), he remarked that Food Allowance was 
basically a food stamp, but it was better because recipients could use it to meet other 
basic needs.78 São Paulo Senator Eduardo Suplicy, a longtime advocate of a guaranteed 
minimum income for all Brazilians, had disagreed with the food stamp idea ever since it 
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was proposed, also arguing that the poor have needs that go beyond food (Suplicy 2004: 
151-152). At the first meeting of the PT Executive in 2003, he proposed an experiment 
pairing two poor cities, with one requiring program recipients to spend the money on 
food and the other not, with a comparison of results after five months.79 
Though, overall, the Food Card was a complicated program, there is one way in 
which it was extremely simple. Families received a flat amount (50 reais monthly); the 
benefit did not depend on household size nor did it vary with household income. Suplicy 
(2004: 153) contrasts this with the U.S. food stamp program, which essentially works as a 
negative income tax (for specifics see Klerman and Danielson 2009). 
 Whatever one thinks about requiring recipients to buy food in principle, in 
practice it met multiple obstacles. In the U.S., automated cash registers and bar codes 
make it much easier to only allow recipients to only use their electronic cards to buy 
approved, unprepared food items with their benefits. If a state decided to prohibit the 
purchase of soft drinks (as some have advocated), implementing this would be relatively 
straightforward. 
 On January 8 2003 Folha de São Paulo reported that food card recipients in 
Guaribas would be required to provide receipts to prove they spent the money on food80 
and Graziano reiterated this requirement.81 As the program approached its official launch, 
this remained a point of confusion and controversy. Management Committees, made up 	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of local members of civil society, were responsible for selecting beneficiaries and 
monitoring the program. Representatives of the committees in Acuã and Guaribas stated 
that only foods that are part of the basic basket could be purchased. State coordinator 
Rosângela Maria de Souza stated that she never gave this instruction during trainings, but 
a member of the committee for Guaribas stated “Those who receive the money and 
violate the rule a second time will have the benefit canceled.”82 The Secretary of Health 
for Acauã reported that yogurt would be among the prohibited foods.83 A coordinator for 
the program in Piauí said that the only prohibited purchases would be soft drinks, 
cigarettes, and alcohol.84 A member of the Management Committee in Guaribas 
complained that he received contradictory instructions from the state and national level of 
the program.85  
 Studies of existing cash transfers found that the money was largely being spent on 
food already. The mayor’s office for São Paulo reported that 70% of the money from its 
cash transfers went to food purchases.86 The Ministry of Education figures put the portion 
of School Allowance spent on food at 87%87 and a Unicamp study by Mariana Bittar 
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found that recipients of the transfer Minimum Income Campinas (Renda Mínima de 
Campinas) spent 43% of their income from the transfer on food and only 2% on 
beverages and cigarettes.88 
 Getting receipts was a major challenge in some parts of Brazil. For example, only 
two merchants in Guaribas offered them.89 This directly undermined the goal of having 
recipients buy from small producers, since the primary place to buy local grown products 
was open-air farmers’ markets where buyers and sellers prefer to be without the 
paperwork of receipts.90 Members of the Food Security Committee in Guaribas reported 
that it was easy to circumvent the requirement to spend money on food.91 
 Early on Graziano said that it was up to the Management Committees to decide 
how to enforce the requirement.92 From the beginning some responded to the reports 
about requiring receipts by saying a spoken pledge to only spend the money on food 
would be sufficient.93 The ultimate effect of was confusion about the program, appearing 
unprepared to manage a program, poor communication. It also meant a lot of time and 
energy that could have been spent elsewhere.  
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 One great irony about Graziano’s resistance to building upon cash transfer 
programs inherited from Cardoso is that these programs were in large part the fruit of the 
PT’s efforts (Coêlho 2012). The two principal figures advocating versions of the cash 
transfer, Suplicy and Buarque, were from his own party (Buarque left the PT in 2005). 
The driving force behind many of the antecedent programs had been the PT and parties 
trying to compete with it in this policy area. Treating these policies as belonging to solely 
to Cardoso was conceding something that was actually the result of a back-and-forth 
process of political competition. Far from borrowing an idea from Cardoso, it would be 
borrowing the idea back after Cardoso had put a new coat of paint on it.  
 
Choosing Municipalities 	  
 Having decided how to start, the next decision was where to start. Budget and 
capacity made it impossible to roll out the Food Card everywhere at once. MESA had to 
decide which states and municipalities with which to start.  
 It was decided that two pilot municipalities in the northeastern state of Piauí 
would serve to develop policies for use throughout Brazil. While Piauí is certainly one of 
the poorest states in Brazil by any measure, PT candidate Wellington Dias’s election in 
2002 to be governor of Piauí also made this an appealing state, since an allied governor 
would be likely to support the program.94 The selection of the two pilot municipalities 
was met with arguments that other municipalities were worse off than those selected. 
Athias drew attention the municipality Nossa Senhora dos Remédios, also in Paiuí, where 
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nearly 30% of children under six were malnourished according to Ministry of Health data 
from 2000, pointing out the municipality’s absence from the pilot program.95  
 In addition to the pilots, Zero Hunger selected an initial list of 957 municipalities 
to work in (out of about 5500 in the entire country). Though starting in Piauí may have 
appeared politically motivated, the selection of municipalities lacked any clear partisan 
bias. Folha reported, “Of the 179 cities attended as of the start of May, 25% have PFL 
mayors and 24% PMDB mayors. None has mayor from the PT.”96 However, the list 
included 195 municipalities in Piauí, but none in neighboring Maranhão, which actually 
had more municipalities in need according to the 2000 Municipal Human Development 
index compiled by IBGE (The Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics) and IPEA 
(The Institute for Applied Economic Research). Of the bottom twenty municipalities on 
an Index of Social Exclusion developed at Unicamp, only nine had been selected to be 
part of Zero Hunger.97 The reason given for Maranhão not being on the initial list was 
because it did not have municipalities in a federal state of emergency due to drought.98 
There were similar complaints about the municipalities selected when the program 
expanded to Rio Grande do Norte, with the mayor of Venha-Ver arguing that his 
municipality, with a poor Human Development Index, had been excluded because it 	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strongly supported Lula’s opponent in the 2002 election, Brazilian Social Democratic 
Party (PSDB) candidate José Serra.99  
 Once it had decided to start with a small number of municipalities MESA was 
bound to receive this kind of criticism.  Whatever criteria it employed to select the 
municipalities in the worst shape, different criteria would suggest a different set of 
“correct” ones. This foreshadows a central theme of the next two chapters: how we 
measure hunger and poverty has important implications for the conclusions we draw 
about policies to combat them. 
 The decision to start by only bringing the Food Card to some municipalities in 
some states added a great deal of complexity. MESA had to create a process to decide 
who was in and who was out, among a great number of needy municipalities. When 
MESA announced in April 2003 that it would expand to municipalities in the 
northeastern states Paraiba and Pernambuco, the scale was again modest, with fifteen 
municipalities in Paraiba, where they would again select 500 families in each 
municipality.100 
 Municipalities not in the targeted regions could become part of Zero Hunger, 
provided they formed a Management Committee first.101 At a national meeting of PT city 
council members and state deputies Graziano told them, “If the program hasn’t arrived 
there [the cities] yet, it’s their fault, because they haven’t formed a Management 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 de Oliveira, Eduardo. April 29, 2003. “Excluídos Do RN Criticam Escolha Do Fome 
Zero.” Folha de São Paulo. 
 
100 de Oliveira, Eduardo. April 3, 2003. “Paraíba e Pernambuco Serão Os Próximos a 
Receber o Fome Zero.” Folha de São Paulo. 
 
101 Betto, Frei. March 27, 2003. “Fome Zero Nos Municípios.” Folha de São Paulo. 
 
 69	  
Committee. We want this to be a bottom-up program. Don’t just wait for the Food Card 
to arrive.” 102 This issue of forming Management Committees and the emphasis on a 
bottom-up, participatory approach leads us to our next topic: how to go about selecting 
500 households in each municipality, given the widespread poverty in most of them. 
 
Choosing Individuals 	  
 The next key decision was which households would get the Food Card. Lula 
inherited a list of the poor throughout Brazil called the Universal Registry (cadastro 
unico). This was a work in progress, with plenty of errors and omissions. A recent report 
by the Supreme Court of Audit (TCU) had found irregularities in the unified registry, 
with recipients with income too high to qualify receiving benefits.103 Graziano did not 
hold back in criticizing the registry, and blaming it for MESA’s slow progress: “We 
inherited this registry from the previous government. Half the families were included 
because of personal favoritism. The registry is shameful [vergonhoso]. Because of this, 
we have to do it again.”104 Graziano contended these errors included electoral targeting105 
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and explained that his intent was to fix the registry they inherited, not to begin a new 
one.106  
 In focusing on the northeast, the government was enacting policy in a region 
where the PT was historically weak and with a long history of personalistic, clientelistic 
politics. The registry clearly needed to be fixed but how to do it, especially given the 
likely challenges posed by local politicians in these municipalities? MESA decided to 
delegate the work of updating the registry to the Management Committees, made up 
largely of members of civil society. Participatory government had long been part of “the 
PT way of governing” (Wampler 2007: 37), with the most famous example being 
participatory budgeting at the municipal level. The 2001 plan’s emphasis on participation 
from civil society was in this same tradition. 
 The decision to attempt participatory government in the face of local politics 
hostile to their agenda suggests those in charge did not understand the successes of 
participatory budgeting very well. This was not the result of a bottom-up process, but a 
top-down one. Wampler explains, “Ironically, mayors must first centralize authority in 
their own hands before they can hand that authority back to citizens through PB 
[participatory budgeting]” (2007: 36). In other words, the PT had not established the 
authority it was trying to delegate. 
 The procedure for forming the Management Councils was as follows. MESA 
agents would supervise an assembly to elect representatives, with a super-majority of 
seats going to representatives of civil society. All representatives of civil society were 
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elected by the entire assembly. This council was then in charge of meeting to select the 
Food Card recipients (Ansell 2007: 145-146; Takagi 2011: 67). 
 This was clearly an attempt to do a run-around the mayors and establish a new 
center of power for anti-hunger policy. Given the state of politics in many of these 
municipalities, the appeal of doing this is clear. It is also unsurprising that many mayors 
were having none of it. 
 The approach of some mayors was to resist the incursion into their political 
territory. Ansell details such a response in the municipality he studied (2007: 138). The 
program met with resistance from mayors in other municipalities as well; a former 
MESA agent I interviewed told of other agents being run out of town. 107 By attempting 
to build a new program from scratch MESA angered those already responsible for social 
protection at the local level. 
 Other mayors responded by attempting cooptation. Folha reported: “In at least 64 
of the 218 cities in Paraíba attended by Zero Hunger, the mayors are accused of 
controlling—and using electorally—the program.”108 They did this by controlling the 
Management Committees. Corruption is not a new problem in Brazil, but complexity 
allowed mayors more opportunities to intervene inappropriately. 
 Just as some in the PT criticized the existing cash transfers for being politicized, 
the opposition in turn expressed similar concerns about the new citizen committees. 
PSDB federal deputy Sabastião Madeira said, “Nothing is stopping the executive from 	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saying that the control in a particular municipality is in the hands of the PT or the CUT 
[Unified Workers’ Central, Brazil’s primary labor confederation].”109 Likewise, Rafael 
Cariello alleged that the PT was attempting to use the program to make inroads in 
municipalities.110 
 Graziano told a group of federal deputies, “We’re being vigilant to make sure the 
committees don’t become partisan nuclei in the interior.”111 Frei Betto also shared these 
concerns, saying that it was society’s job to make sure that did not happen.112 There is 
good reason to believe they were sincere. At a PT meeting where militants demanded a 
more central role in Zero Hunger, Graziano rebuffed them, arguing that the program was 
for all Brazilians, and not just one party.113 In any case, if the Committees had been an 
attempt to take over local politics they failed; the PT lost in the 2004 mayoral elections in 
both pilot municipalities.114 However, in 2003 what mattered most was the perception. 
 While the politics of bypassing the mayors and of party conflict are clear, the 
problems with selecting beneficiaries extend well beyond this. Though one of the 
criticisms of the municipal governments—justifying making these new committees—was 
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the limited capacity of municipal government,115 the committees ended up having the 
same problem. An early hint was the Food Card’s launch, in Acauã February 24, 2003, 
where they only gave out 218 cards.116 This modest beginning is in marked contrast to the 
scale Zero Hunger promised, and not even half of already modest the 500-card target. 
 In an interview with PT activists in Teresina, Piauí, including Rosângela Sousa, 
who had directed Zero Hunger in Piauí, the activists complained about the use of the 
committees, giving the example of a woman on one of the committees who worked 
several jobs and then had to do this volunteer work on top of that. “It should be the 
properly constituted authority doing this work,” one remarked.117 Ana Fonseca, who 
headed Bolsa Família until it was placed under MDS, agreed. In an interview with 
anthropologist Aaron Ansell she said: 
I don’t like the idea of a crippled, neoliberal state. The state needs to be more active, 
not less active. We can’t bypass the municipal governments and leave it to civil 
society to do this. It’s the state’s job to find out who the poorest members of society 
are, not that of civil society. The mayor is democratically elected; he is the public 
power, the state. We need to start respecting that democratic process (Ansell 2007: 
168). 
 
 Management Committees were another attempt to create a new entity instead of 
trying to make use of what was already there. Municipalities already had mayors, 
municipal staff, and social assistance offices. Instead of doing a run-around to avoid 
them, the alternative was to seek a relationship that incorporated the mayors into a 
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programatic policy and constrained their ability to personalize or politicize transfers. This 
is exactly what Bolsa Família later did. 
 Ansell points out that MESA’s concern was that the committees had consistent, 
objective criteria, not what they were (2007: 147). This means that there could have 
potentially been a thousand different standards in a thousand differentness municipalities. 
Advocates might argue that this is a benefit because it empowers the local community to 
decide its own standards and the committee members are those who know their 
community best. 
 Yet this close knowledge had a significant downside. Recall that one of 
Graziano’s specific complaints about the registry was that it was personalized and 
politicized. In a small rural community using a Management Committee also meant that 
the decisions about who gets the five hundred cards were incredibly personal for the 
committee members. This is a recurring theme in Ansell’s (2007) ethnography and in my 
interviews with people who had served on the Management Committee in the same 
municipality.118 
 There is all the difference in the world between having a forum where civil 
society can recommend policies and charging civil society with carrying out those 
policies. Doing the latter was a sharp break with the existing institutions providing social 
protection, and led to a complex, and controversial, process for selecting program 
recipients.  
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 After the reorganization in early 2004, the new Minister of Social Protection, 
Patrus Ananias, criticized the committees saying many members were not properly 
trained for their responsibilities.119 He later remarked, “If president Cardoso did a 
disservice to Brazil, it wasn’t only in his economic policy. It was also in his dismantling 
of the state, privileging actions with non-government organizations…We’re 
reconstructing the Brazilian state.”120   
 The Management Committees had their defenders. Bishop Mauro Morelli 
criticized the decision to get rid of them, saying “…without the active participation of the 
citizens, it is difficult to escape two terrible things: bureaucracy and corruption.”121 
However, the committees created had both and it was time to try a different policy 
design. 
 
How Bolsa Família is different 	  
 By May 2003 plans to unify Brazil’s transfer programs were already under 
way,122 though MESA survived until the end of the year. Bolsa Família returned to the 
state the role of selecting beneficiaries for new social programs, but, responding to the 
challenges of federalism, it did so in a particular way. The municipalities register 	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applicants, but MDS processes the applications and manages the actual transfers, in 
partnership with Caixa, a state-owned bank (Soares 2012). 
 Having the municipalities register program applicants achieves several things. In 
marked contrast to the blatant attempt to bypass mayors through the Management 
Committees, Bolsa Família makes them part of the process and allows them to claim 
some of the credit for benefits delivered. However, it also greatly limits opportunities for 
political manipulation, since the municipality never touches the money. Professionals in 
Brasília process the application, greatly limiting opportunities for favoritism. In addition, 
since it is their full time job instead of volunteer service, they can do this work faster. 
 Instead of having a debate in each municipality about who should receive the 
transfer, the law establishing Bolsa Famíla sets established standard criteria for 
qualification: per capita income thresholds. In practice, measuring income of the 
extremely poor is difficult, so the program also uses a household survey instrument as a 
proxy measure, but the definition of poverty is clear and standardized (Lindert et al. 
2007; Soares 2012).  
  From an administrative point of view, incorporating the municipalities is a 
response to policy legacies, in this case the asymmetrical federalism created by the 1988 
constitution, that uses an existing resource instead of creating a new political entity and 
allows things to move forward faster by avoiding startup costs. Using the existing four 
cash transfers as a starting point achieves the same goal and also reduces the number of 
clearances needed to make the policy work. 
 Zero Hunger started in particular municipalities even though some measures 
indicated that excluded it municipalities were worse off. Regardless of actual 
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motivations, some in the opposition alleged political targeting. Instead of using one 
measure, which could be subject to such criticisms, MDS determines targets based on the 
econometric model developed in partnership with The World Bank (Fried 2012). In other 
words, the administrators delegated the program to technocrats in order to de-politicize it.  
 The most important difference in selecting municipalities is that by moving 
rapidly towards nationwide coverage it minimized the period of time when it existed in 
some places and not in others. One of the reasons it was able to expand so quickly was by 
building on existing programs and being a focused, simple program.  
 At the level of individuals, Bolsa Família also provides a simple response to 
debates about why one poor family receives support when another does not: strive for 
universal coverage. Soares (2012) explains that the program is a “quasi-right,” because 
budgeting limits the total number who can be enrolled in the program. In principle, the 
idea is that any household with a qualifying per capita income should receive the benefit. 
With the Food Card, the initial limit of 500 households per municipality inevitably 
created the problem of having to exclude extremely poor people who also needed 
assistance, leading to unnecessary conflict. 
 
Conclusion 	  
 The relationship between Bolsa Família and Zero Hunger was a point of 
confusion. In March 2004, Zilda Arns wrote: 
There is confusion between the programs Zero Hunger and Bolsa Família that the 
federal government should elucidate. Does one substitute the other? Does one 
compete with the other? My understanding is that the government’s priority is Zero 
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Hunger. Bolsa Família is a program within Zero Hunger, created to reinforce it with 
cash transfers … Zero Hunger can’t be restricted to Bolsa Família…⁠123 
I encountered both descriptions in my interviews. For example, Newton Gomes, Jr., who 
had worked in food security for decades and briefly served in MESA and whose 
dissertation is discussed in Chapter 2, pointed to the moment of Bolsa Família’s creation 
as when it was all over for Zero Hunger.124  
 The Lula Government resisted this understanding. In August 2004 Lula 
announced that it would put the Zero Hunger logo on all of the Bolsa Família cards. 
Minister Patrus Ananias explained that this was “…because there are frequently 
unreasonable references about Zero Hunger” including that the program had ended.125” 
So, what is the answer to Arns’s question? 
 Bolsa Família competed with the main thing MESA was doing: the Food Card, 
and thus with MESA. So it was competing with the key part of Zero Hunger in 2003. 
This did not preclude Lula’s government to redefining Zero Hunger and continuing to 
develop a wide range of policies in areas related to food security under a different 
structure. Instead of charging a special ministry with very little power or resources with 
taking the lead, the new approach left ministries in charge of their traditional policy areas. 
MDS, whose full name is The Ministry of Social Development and the Fight Against 
Hunger, has a Secretariat for Food Security. The Inter-Ministerial Assembly for Food and 
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Nutritional Security (CAISAN) brings representatives of various ministries together to 
plan and coordinate policy, but ultimately responsibility for implementing policy remains 
with the separate ministries.126 The National Council for Food and Nutrition Security, 
which Lula revived as part of Zero Hunger and is housed in the executive (Casa Civil), 
provides a forum for representatives of civil society to advise the government about food 
policy. The ultimate responsibility for making and implementing that policy remains that 
of the state.  
 The 2001 proposal was right in recognizing that no one thing is going to solve the 
problem of hunger. The error, however, was to think that all those separate things needed 
to be tied up with each other in their implementation. In writing this I conflict with the 
perspective I encountered in many of my interviews. For example, one of the people at 
the Ministry of Health responsible for its work in nutrition emphasized the need for 
everyone in food security to work together.127 At a CONSEA meeting I attended in May 
2011, Francisco Antonio da Fonseca Menezes, one of the most prominent figures in 
Brazilian food politics and head of CONSEA from 2004-2007, argued that food security 
is like a car, and all the parts need to work together for it to go forward.128 Metaphors are 
mental models. Like any models they have their limits. The question is, what are the 
consequences of thinking this way? The evidence just surveyed suggests that this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 CAISAN. 2011. “Plano Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional – 2012/2015.” 
http://www.mds.gov.br/segurancaalimentar/arquivos/LIVRO_PLANO_NACIONAL_CA
ISAN_FINAL.pdf 
 
127 Interview with public official at General Coordinator for Food and Nutrition (CGAN), 
Ministry of Health. March 22, 2011. 
 
128 Interview with Francisco Antonio da Fonseca Menezes, former head of CONSEA. 
May 4, 2011. Brasília. 
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approach can lead to unnecessary complexity that undermines a policy’s chances for 
success.  
 Two indicators of Bolsa Família’s success are that it has maintained the same 
basic program design for ten years and it reaches over thirteen million Brazilian 
households.129 Since this ended up as one of the principal policies designed to combat 
poverty and hunger, a natural next question is how well it has done this, the topic of the 
next two chapters. The answer in part depends on how we conceive, and measure, 
poverty and hunger. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Figure for 2011. 
	   
CHAPTER 4: REDUCING POVERTY 
Introduction 	  
The previous chapter argues that Bolsa Família emerged as Lula’s most 
prominent new social policy because it built upon what Cardoso had already done, 
combining and expanding existing cash transfer programs, and that this simple approach 
contributed to its success. Chapter 2 reviewed studies finding the program is 
programmatic and well targeted. Given this, and given that the program just celebrated its 
tenth birthday, it is reasonable to expect it to have been successful in reducing poverty. 
 For an example of how Bolsa Família has transformed lives, consider this account 
from the magazine Carta Capital, profiling Rogéria Maria da Silva Lima and her family 
in Ipaumirim, Ceará: 
“The family’s income is 130 reais per month, divided between 94 reais that they 
receive for having two children enrolled in Bolsa Familia (the youngest, Ranieli, 
is no longer registered) and 30 or 40 reais that her husband, José Marcio dos 
Santos, earns from odd jobs. 
 
Once per week they eat meat at a family meal, usually chicken but sometimes a 
bit of red meat. Less than once a week Marcio buys “salad”: a tomato or an onion, 
divided between the five family members. The foods most consumed are manioc 
flour, rice and milk….With Bolsa Família, Rogéria buys biscuits, a liter of oil, 
margarine, soap, another piece of clothing and eventually shoes. The water does 
not cost very much, the stove is wood fired, and electricity is shared with the 
neighbor. With Bolsa Família she has enough to “get through the month” (my 
translation).130 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 de Athayde, Phydia. July 2, 2008. “Nossa fome cotidiana.” Carta Capital.  
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 One interpretation of Ms. Silva Lima’s story is to see it as the Lula Government 
beginning to make good on his promise to work towards a Brazil where everyone eats 
three meals a day. Of course, one anecdote does not establish the program’s success; this 
requires systematic evidence.  
Assessing Bolsa Família’s impact on poverty requires carefully thinking about (1) 
how we measure poverty and (2) the conception of poverty implicit in each measure. 
Continuous measures better reflect a conception of poverty as how far away a household 
is from being able to meet its basic needs and are thus better for assessing how well Bolsa 
Família achieved its intended goals. Bolsa Família was never supposed to eradicate 
poverty all by itself, but to be a step in this direction. The idea was to (1) give the poor 
enough money to let them better meet basic needs and (2) use this money to incentivize 
the improvement of human capital through education and health, giving the next 
generation a better chance to escape poverty; this chapter focuses on the first objective. 
On the basis of understanding poverty as a continuous variable, this chapter 
argues that while we cannot directly credit Bolsa Família with bringing many households 
completely out of poverty or extreme poverty, alternative measures taking into account 
how far a household falls below a poverty line show it did significantly reduce the 
severity of that poverty, and thus did what it was designed to do. This important 
achievement also helps explain Bolsa Família’s political relevance. 
This chapter focuses on income poverty. People clearly have needs that cannot be 
readily met through income,131 such as education, healthcare, clean water, sanitation, and 
security. Bolsa Família’s conditions are an effort to connect the poor to education and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 At least at the levels being discussed. Granted, those with higher incomes can provide 
for such services privately. 
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health care services. In addition, Bolsa Família is part of a group of policies aimed at 
reducing poverty. These include raising the minimum wage, increasing government 
pensions for poor seniors, and expanding access to credit.  
 Bolsa Família had a tangible benefit on Ms. Silva Lima’s family; the family is 
less poor than it was prior to receiving the transfer, but remains poor. Characterizing 
them as less poor implies that poverty is a continuous space. The alternative way of 
thinking about poverty is as a binary: a household is poor or it is not. More common in 
social science research is to say that some families are extremely poor, some are poor, 
and the rest are not poor. 
Applying this approach to Ms. Silva Lima’s family, we see that their per capita 
income is 26 reais per month (130 divided by five family members). The per capita 
income from sources other than Bolsa Família (her husband’s work) is about 8 reais per 
month. Both fall under Bolsa Família’s definition of extreme poverty (in 2008) of 60 
reais per capita monthly income. Regional poverty lines based on the price of a basket of 
basic goods adjusted for local prices put the extreme poverty line for the northeast at 
96.36 reais per capita monthly income for urban areas and 85.94 for rural areas (IPEA 
2011a). So, whichever line we use, the family was in extreme poverty before receiving 
Bolsa Família and remains in extreme poverty after. 
 That her household remained in extreme poverty is not surprising once we 
consider the program’s benefit structure. Since its creation, the program has classified 
eligible families as either poor or extremely poor. Extremely poor families receive both a 
(per household) basic benefit and variable benefits for each child and (after 2008) 
adolescent enrolled in school. Poor families only receive the variable benefit. Ms. Silva 
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Lima’s monthly benefit of 94 reais represents a basic benefit of 58 reais plus 18 reais for 
each of her two children.  So, while benefits partly scale with household size, they do not 
do so as fast as the increase in total household income required to bring per capita 
monthly household income above the extreme poverty line, since each additional 
household member adds 60 reais (under the 2008 definition) to that line. 
Chapter 2 summarized the findings from three studies of Bolsa Família’s impact 
on poverty. All found that the impact on headcount poverty was very small. This raises 
the following puzzle: if the program brings so few households out of poverty or extreme 
poverty, why is it widely viewed as effective? One familiar with the program might 
respond that there is no puzzle here at all. Close to one in four Brazilian households 
receives Bolsa Família; in 2006 the average household participating in the program 
received 71.60 reais, making the average transfer equivalent to about a third of 
recipients’ average food budgets (IBASE 2008). The impact on the Silva Lima household 
was even more pronounced. In other words, it is a valuable benefit being delivered to a 
large number of people, and this allows them to better meet their needs.  
 The full extent of Bolsa Família’s success is only evident when we move beyond 
simple headcount measures. Evaluations of the program must take into account decreases 
in the severity of poverty, which requires looking at alternative poverty measures. 
Chapter 2 briefly introduced the headcount, income gap, intensity, and ordinal poverty 
measures and their strengths and shortcomings. The next section looks at these measures 
in greater detail, including the equations used for each measure.   
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Poverty Measurement   
Headcount (H) 	  
By far the most common poverty measure is headcount, which simply establishes 
a poverty line (or multiple lines to reflect regional differences in the cost of living) and 
expresses the number of households under that line as a fraction of the overall population. 
If q is the number of poor households and n is the total number of households, then our 
headcount measure is 
H = q/n 
Sen (1976) argues that this poverty measure violates two axioms central to an 
adequate conception of poverty: 
Monotonicity Axiom: Given other things, a reduction in income of a person below 
the poverty line must increase the poverty measure. 
Transfer Axiom: Given other things, a pure transfer of income from a person 
below the poverty line to anyone who is richer must increase the poverty measure.  
Using the headcount measure, once someone is below the poverty line it does not 
matter how far below the line she falls. In short, there is no “partial credit.” On the other 
hand, it has the advantage of being easy to understand. In addition, one need not estimate 
a household’s precise income if it clearly falls well below the poverty line, which is an 
advantage since it can be difficult to report exact incomes for such households. 
 
Income gap (I) 	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Given that headcount (H) fails to take account of a household’s distance to the 
poverty line, an alternative is to focus on this distance. This is called the income gap, 
expressed as gi for a given household, i. We normalize it over the poverty line to get an 
individual household’s income gap ratio. If we sum these ratios for all households and 
divide by the total number of poor households we have the income gap measure of 
poverty (I). 
As an equation, we express this as 
I = Σ gi/qz  
Where gi is the income gap, q is the total number of poor people, and z is the poverty 
line. 
The income gap measure (I) is in many ways the mirror image of the headcount 
(H). It tells us nothing about how many people are poor. Different scenarios can produce 
the same income gap measure (I) with different numbers of poor people (H). This is not 
satisfactory either since, all else being equal, we prefer fewer people to be poor. 
 
Intensity (HI) 	  
The simplest way to combine information about the number of poor people and 
their average income shortfall is to take the product of the headcount measure (H) and the 
income gap measure (I) in order to produce the intensity measure (HI).132 Brady (2003: 
727) summarizes the advantage of this approach as a “simple, parsimonious measure 
combining quantity and depth of poverty.” In addition, since both headcount (H) and 
income gap (I) may be communicated to a more general audience (something decidedly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Some scholars also use the term “interval” for the same measure. 
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not true of the ordinal measures surveyed below), it is but one more simple step to 
multiply them together. The problem with the intensity measure—a problem all three of 
these measures share—is it ignores the distribution of income among the poor, a point to 
which we return shortly. 
 
Conceptions of poverty 	  
Behind each measure is a conceptual understanding of poverty. Headcount (H) 
reflects a binary categorization. It is more common to think of poverty as an ordinal 
variable ⁠133 where someone is either extremely poor, poor (but not extremely so), or not 
poor. We may also think of this as collapsing poverty into two binaries where all of the 
extremely poor also fall into the poor category.  
An alternative is to think of poverty as a continuous space. As Brady (2003: 728) 
puts it, summarizing the work of Harold Watts, “In reality, poverty is not a discrete 
condition that is immediately acquired or shed by crossing any particular income line.” 
That is, someone can be more or less poor. At some point she stops being poor altogether, 
meaning the need for a poverty line remains. Income gap (I) reflects this understanding of 
poverty. Intensity (HI) combines the two conceptions into one measure. 
 
Relative Deprivation and Ordinal Measures (O) 	  
It could also be that how poor a household is depends on its position relative to 
others in society. This is captured by the concept of relative deprivation (Sen 1983). Sen 
(1976) argues the three measures just surveyed are insufficient because they ignore the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Not to be confused with ordinal measures, discussed shortly. 
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distribution of income among the poor. That is, among various scenarios producing the 
same values for H and I, we should prefer the one with greater equality among the poor. 
We order the poor from poorest to least poor and weigh the income gaps according to 
their place in this ordering (hence his term “ordinal rank weights” and referring to this 
family of measures as ordinal measures). He proposes a poverty measure that satisfies all 
of his axioms and may be derived from headcount (H), income gap (I), and the Gini 
coefficient of inequality among the poor (G).  
Since the publication of Sen’s work, scholars have presented several alternative 
ordinal measures, including that of Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984, 2010). They 
provide the following formula: 
Pα = (1/n)Σ(gi/z)α,  
Where n is the total number of households, gi is the income gap for a household (i), z is 
the poverty line and α is “…a measure of poverty aversion: A larger α gives greater 
emphasis to the poorest poor” (Foster, Greer, Thorbecke 1984). When α = 0 the measure 
is headcount (H). When α = 1 it is the intensity measure (HI). When α = 2 it is an ordinal 
measure (O). Two of the studies surveyed below apply the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
measure, as does this chapter. 
Sen argues there should always be an “absolutist core” to any conception of 
poverty (1983) and that for developing countries absolute measures are most appropriate 
(1999). In addition, Brady (2003) writes: 
…some evidence exists that the variation in O [the ordinal measure] not captured 
by HI [intensity] is empirically unimportant (Myles & Picot 2000; Osberg & Xu 
2000). Hence, O often adds unneeded complexity that may obscure national 
comparisons of poverty (Atkinson 1987; Hagenaars 1991). Therefore if one seeks 
a sufficient yet parsimonious measure and prefers to avoid the complexity and 
assumptions of O, HI may be the best alternative. 
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However, the studies finding little difference between severity and ordinal poverty focus 
on advanced capitalist democracies. Reporting an ordinal measure will allow me to test 
how closely the two measures track in a middle-income country with a long history of 
extreme inequality. 
Let me illustrate the information gained by using the different measures for the 
case of two hypothetical Brazilian families in 2009, each with two adults and two 
children. Household A makes 100 reais per month and Household B makes 460 reais per 
month. Table 4.1 calculates their per capita income and the benefits they would receive 
under Bolsa Família in 2009. Household A—like Ms. Silva Lima’s family—remains in 
extreme poverty; a much smaller transfer pushes Household B across the poverty line.  
Table 4.2 presents each household’s distance to the poverty line and, for 
Household A, the extreme poverty line. We see that, though Household A did not cross 
the extreme poverty line, the reduction for Household A is much greater when expressed 
relative to the total poverty and extreme poverty lines. So, which household saw a greater 
reduction in its poverty depends on how we measure it. 
Poverty reduction from cash transfers, then, is a result of (1) program design, (2) 
the poverty measure used, (3) the poverty line(s) used, and (4) the incomes of poor 
households prior to transfers. If most of Brazil’s poor households look like Household A 
we will see little reduction in headcount, but a great reduction in the severity of poverty. 
If most look like Household B we will see the opposite. In reality, of course, the poor are 
heterogeneous and we will see both effects: but how much of each?  
Critical thresholds clearly exist; such thresholds are likely multiple for each 
household and represent points where a household faces major opportunity costs pitting 
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essential needs against one another. At some point a household must choose between not 
paying rent, going without food, or going without medicine. At another point it can only 
pay for one of the three. Thus we should expect to see many income thresholds that 
qualitatively change the character of a household’s poverty. Income gap and intensity 
measures help us capture this, especially in the case of extreme poverty. If we see a 
greater reduction in poverty according to these measures this should help us to 
understand the program’s political popularity.  
 
Research Design 	  
What would poverty levels look like if we were to take Bolsa Família away from 
its recipients? To answer this question, I calculated these poverty measures for Brazil in 
2009 and then calculated what the measures would be without Bolsa Família. Looking at 
poverty measures before and after taxes and transfers is a common approach in the study 
of the welfare state (e.g. Myles and Picot 2000, Brady 2003). The difference here is that I 
calculated the impact of one transfer. Such an approach is “first-order” and does not take 
into account “second-order” effects (Myles and Picot 2000; Kelly 2009: 24-25). Such 
effects, including multiplier effects, exist (IPEA 2011b), but are beyond the scope of this 
article. 
In addition to selecting measures, a researcher must make two additional 
decisions: where to draw the poverty line(s) and how to account for household size 
(Rainwater and Smeeding 2003). Regarding the poverty lines, I adopted the approach of 
Soares and Sátyro (2009) and Soares et al. (2010), and used the program eligibility lines 
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as definitions of poverty and extreme poverty. This allows us to assess Bolsa Família 
according to its own criteria for who is poor and extremely poor. 
Accounting for household size is less straightforward. One extreme is to analyze 
household income without accounting for size at all. While some take this approach, it 
raises the obvious problem that a larger family requires more income to attain a given 
standard of living. The other extreme is to assume the cost of meeting an individual’s 
needs is independent of household size and use per capita income. This is the approach 
taken in the studies surveyed above. The standard advocated by researchers associated 
with the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is to take the square root of household size and 
treat this as “equivalent household size” in order to arrive at an approximate 
accommodation for larger households’ economies of scale (Rainwater and Smeeding 
2003, LIS 2012). My analysis looked at both per capita and equivalent household size for 
two reasons. First, it allows for a comparison with the studies already surveyed. Second, 
it provides an opportunity to see how much difference there is between the two 
approaches. 
I used Philippe Van Kerm’s “poverty” plugin for the statistical package Stata 11.2 
to calculate all of the poverty measures just discussed. First, I did this for per capita 
household income (with and without Bolsa Família). Like Soares and Sátyro (2009) and 
Soares and colleagues (2010) I used the program eligibility lines as definitions of poverty 
and extreme poverty. I then calculated the same measures using equivalent household 
income, following the convention of taking the square root of household size, as outlined 
above. 
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Data 	  
Brazil’s annual National Household Sample Survey, the PNAD, provides detailed 
individual and household-level information. The 2009 PNAD includes 121,163 
households, is a representative sample of the country, and includes information about 
total household income and the sources of that income. It probably underestimates 
income due to under-reported informal sector sources (Ferreira et al. 2000).  
To arrive at total household income I added up all the income categories for an 
individual and then summed these for each household. For the income without Bolsa 
Família I subtracted Bolsa Família from total income.  
Unfortunately the PNAD provide neither a separate variable for Bolsa Família, 
nor one for cash transfers. Such income falls under the interest variable, v1273 
(presumably because it is non-work income): “Interest from savings accounts and other 
financial investments, dividends, social programs and other income normally received in 
the reference month” (my translation). Soares and colleagues (2010) rightly describe this 
as an “absurdly heterogeneous” category. Poor households are unlikely to receive actual 
interest from investments and richer individuals are likely to receive investment income 
and not receive transfers, but the limits of this assumption remain unknown.  
Like Soares and colleagues I calculated the maximum possible benefit (in 2009) 
and used this as the cut-off point for where benefits stop and other income begins.134 
There have been several modifications to Bolsa Familia’s benefit structure over the years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 For a longer discussion of alternatives for estimating income from Bolsa Família in 
the PNAD see Soares et al. (2010) and Segall-Correa et al. (2008). 
 93	  
(Soares 2012: 7). Law 11.692 of June 2008 added up to two variable benefits of 30 reais 
for adolescents aged 16-17. In September 2009 the basic benefit increased to 68 reais, the 
variable benefit increased to 22 reais, and the variable benefit for youth increased to 32 
reais. The PNAD does not provide the month an observation was made, requiring the 
choice of which cutoff point to use. I opted to use the value after the increase, just to be 
safe. Thus, after the 2009 increase the maximum possible benefit was one basic benefit 
(R$ 68), three variable benefits (R$ 66), and two youth benefits (R$ 66), for a total of 200 
reais. Thus my Bolsa Família variable is the interest variable with values greater than 
200 reais recoded as zero.135 
 
Results 	  
Table 4.3 estimates how much Bolsa Família directly reduced poverty and 
extreme poverty in 2009, using per capita household income. Table 4.4 does the same, 
using equivalent household income. Both present four measures: headcount (H), income 
gap (I), intensity (HI), and ordinal (O). 
First, consistent with the previous studies, I found a small reduction in headcount 
poverty and extreme poverty. The reduction remained similarly modest when using 
equivalent household income. The reason the results for per capita income were not 
identical to the study by Soares and colleagues (2010) is my study used the poverty lines 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Before the 2009 increase the maximum possible benefit was one basic benefit (R$ 62), 
three variable benefits (R$ 60), and two youth benefits (R$ 60), for a total of 182 reais. A 
robustness check (not shown) using the lower number as the cutoff point for what interest 
income would be assumed to be from Bolsa Família produced virtually identical results, 
with all differences to the right of the decimal place in the figures reported in Tables 4.3 
and 4.4. 
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from Bolsa Família in 2009, where their study adjusted the 2004 lines for inflation to 
allow for comparison across time.  
The reductions in income gap are more substantial, representing over three 
percent of the poverty line and five percent of the extreme poverty line (percentage points 
in the table) when using per capita income. Employing equivalent household income 
shows an even greater impact of nearly five and eight percent of the poverty and extreme 
poverty lines, respectively. This represents a substantial impact on many who did not 
cross a poverty threshold. 
The intensity measure (HI) does not have the same kind of intuitive interpretation 
as its component parts. The most helpful row in this column is the relative (percentage) 
change. We see a large impact of Bolsa Família on poverty, with a seventeen percent 
reduction of poverty for per capita income and a reduction of over a fifth for equivalent 
household income. As expected, the impact on extreme poverty was even greater, over a 
fifth for per capita income and over a quarter for equivalent household income. 
Since the intensity measure is likely new to most readers, it may be helpful to 
make a rough comparison with Brady’s (2003) figures for the same measure in advanced 
capitalist democracies from 1967 to 1997 (using different poverty lines, obviously). For 
market-generated income (pre-taxes and transfers) the mean is 28.1, while for state-
mediated (post-taxes and transfers) the mean is 6.6. Of course, that measures the impact 
of all government programs and not just one transfer, but it gives some sense of how 
much advanced welfare states reduce the intensity measure of poverty. 
The results for the ordinal measure are similar to the results for intensity, 
conforming to Brady’s comments, above. That the reduction in ordinal poverty is slightly 
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larger than intensity represents a greater impact on reducing the poverty of the poorest 
Brazilians, which is what we should expect given the program’s design. It also reveals a 
decline in inequality among the poor, in addition to the widely-reported decline in 
inequality overall. 
 
Conclusion 	  
Chapter 3 argued that Bolsa Familia’s success was due to its simple design and to 
the decision to build upon existing policies. This chapter’s central finding—that Bolsa 
Familia reduced the poverty intensity—means that it has been successful not simply in 
reaching its target population, but in actually helping that population. This suggests that 
taking policy legacies as a starting point and attempting to incorporate them into a simple 
approach can be an effective strategy for expanding social policy. The next chapter 
examines if this approach resulted in fewer hungry Brazilians.  
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Table 4.1 Two scenarios, headcount 
 
  Family A Family B 
Initial household income (R$) 100 460 
Initial per capita income (R$) 25 115 
Initial classification 
Extremely 
poor 
Poor 
 
Basic Benefit (R$) 68 0 
Variable Benefit (R$) 44 44 
Total Benefit (R$) 112 44 
Total post-transfer income (R$) 212 504 
Total post transfer per capita income (R$) 53 126 
   
Post-transfer classification 
Extremely 
poor 
Not poor 
 
 
Benefits and eligibility lines are from late 2009. All values are monthly. 
 
Table 4.2 The same scenarios, distance to poverty line 
 
  Family A Family B 
Income needed to be at poverty line 480 480 
Initial distance to poverty line 380 20 
Initial gap as percentage of poverty line 79.2 4.2 
Post-transfer distance to poverty line 268 0 
Post-transfer gap as percentage of poverty line 55.8 0 
Reduction as percentage of poverty line 23.3 4.2 
      
Income needed to be at the extreme poverty line 240   
Initial distance to extreme poverty line 140   
Initial gap as percentage of extreme poverty line 58.3   
Post-transfer distance to the extreme poverty line 28   
Post-transfer gap as percentage of extreme poverty line 11.7   
Reduction as percentage of extreme poverty line 46.7   
 
 
Benefits and eligibility lines are from late 2009. All values are monthly. 
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Table 4.3: Impact on poverty (per capita income) 
 
  
Headcount 
(%) 
Income Gap 
(%) 
Intensity 
  
Ordinal 
 
Poverty (no Bolsa Família) 12.5 56.9 7.1 5.7 
Poverty (with Bolsa 
Família) 11.1 53.5 5.9 4.6 
          
Change (points) 1.5 3.4 1.2 1.2 
Change (percentage) 11.6 6.0 17.0 20.4 
          
Extreme Poverty (no Bolsa 
Família) 6.6 76.6 5.1 4.6 
Extreme Poverty (with Bolsa 
Família) 5.5 71.6 3.9 3.4 
          
Change (points) 1.1 5.0 1.1 1.2 
Change (percentage) 17.1 6.6 22.6 25.4 
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Table 4.4: Impact on Poverty (equivalent household size) 
 
  
Headcount 
(%) 
Income Gap 
(%) 
Intensity 
 
Ordinal 
 
Poverty (no Bolsa Família) 6.7 75.0 5.1 4.6 
Poverty (with Bolsa 
Família) 5.6 70.3 4.0 3.4 
          
Change (points) 1.1 4.8 1.1 1.1 
Change (percentage) 16.3 6.3 21.6 24.7 
          
Extreme Poverty (no Bolsa 
Família) 4.9 87.9 4.3 4.2 
Extreme Poverty (with Bolsa 
Família) 3.9 80.0 3.1 3.0 
          
Change (points) 1.0 7.9 1.2 1.2 
Change (percentage) 20.3 9.0 27.5 28.4 
 
 
 
	  	  
 
CHAPTER 5: REDUCING HUNGER 	  
Introduction 	  
The discussion in Chapter 2 explains why a cash transfer could be an effective 
anti-hunger policy. People go hungry because they are unable to exchange what they 
have (money, labor, assets, etc.) for what they need (food). In 2003, Brazil, as a net 
exporter of food, did not suffer from a problem of insufficient production, but of 
equitable distribution. So cash transfers provide an additional source of income and 
should improve the ability of the poor to buy food. Power resource theory, also discussed 
in Chapter 2, predicts that a programmatic left government will enact policies effective in 
reducing poverty. Given that poverty is a key cause of hunger, we should expect this 
reduction in poverty to translate into a reduction in hunger. 
The previous chapter showed that, as expected, Bolsa Família had a substantial 
impact on poverty intensity. This chapter argues that this reduction in poverty in turn 
reduced hunger. Within this larger claim, I make five specific points. First, we should 
evaluate Brazil’s progress in fighting hunger in terms of food security instead of 
malnutrition. Second, food insecurity was a significant problem in Brazil when President 
Lula took office. Third, food insecurity declined significantly while Lula was in office. 
Fourth, Bolsa Família provides a valuable benefit, large enough to make a real impact on 
the ability of the poorest to buy food, even in the face of rising food prices. Lastly, Bolsa 
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Família contributed to a reduction in food insecurity over the course of the Lula 
government.  
 
Conceptions of Hunger 	  
Even though Brazil’s program had “hunger” in its name, this chapter avoids the 
term in favor of the more specific "food security" and "under-nutrition."  This is because 
hunger has at least two separate, but related, elements: how much food people have and 
how well it nourishes them. 
Concern with hunger is ultimately rooted in concern with the consequences for 
people's wellbeing. One way to see if people are getting enough food is to look at 
outcomes: if they are properly nourished. The most reliable way to do this is to measure 
people’s bodies. If they are under weight and/or under height, they are likely 
undernourished (Leathers and Foster 2009: 40-41). 
Access to sufficient food is a necessary but not sufficient condition for proper 
nutrition, that requires access to clean water, sanitation, education, and healthcare. When 
illness due to one of these factors prevents the adequate absorption of nutrition from food 
this is called secondary malnutrition (Leathers and Foster 2009: 40-41, Drèze and Sen 
1989:13). This chapter focuses on this question of access to food of sufficient quantity 
and quality; the term for this is food security. This is in accordance with Lula's framing of 
the goal in terms of three meals per day in his 2003 inauguration speech. 
The choice to focus on food security merits further explanation. Given the many 
determinants of nutrition, discussed above, a common causal story for how a conditional 
cash transfer could impact nutrition is as follows (see Figure 5.1). The transfers of cash 
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have an immediate impact on the ability of a household to buy food. Preventive 
healthcare reduces secondary malnutrition over time, as does education. Clean water and 
sanitation are collective goods not covered by the program. The increase in purchasing 
power is unlikely to be sufficient to obtain such services on an individual basis. Weighing 
and measuring children brings stunted and wasted children to the attention of health 
providers who can then respond with supplements, education about feeding, etc. This 
chapter is about the first part: the near immediate impact of being able to buy more food. 
 
Was anybody hungry? 	  
 Establishing that there was a problem is a necessary precursor to evaluating the 
solution. Even though this chapter is about food security, it is illuminating to compare 
estimates of food insecurity with data on under-nutrition, because these data tell a 
somewhat different story. Taken together, they give a rough picture of the state of hunger 
in Brazil around the time Lula took office and announced Zero Hunger. 
Writing in the Folha de São Paulo, Hélio Schwartsman claims that Zero Hunger 
suffered from "an error in diagnosis--in 2003 obesity was already a greater problem than 
malnutrition"136 (author’s translation). While it is certainly true that the "nutrition 
transition" was (and is) leading to rising obesity and declining malnutrition in Brazil 
(Monteiro et al. 1995), this does not mean there were no problems with food security and 
malnutrition.137 The best data available on the subject reveal that food insecurity was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Schwartsman, Hélio. June, 28 2011. “FAO e Fome Zero não podem ser chamados de 
casos de sucesso.” Folha de S. Paulo. 
 
137 In any case, to the degree that obesity results from poor people being forced to eat low 
quality foods (of which they eat an excessive quantity), the problem is also one of food 
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indeed a problem when Lula took office, but less so than some imagined. The previous 
section defined the concepts of under-nutrition and food insecurity. There are multiple 
measures of both, but this chapter only looks at the ones most widely used in Brazil.138  
 
The 2001 estimate 	  
The 2001 proposal, discussed in Chapter 1, did not have a direct measure of 
hunger. It reported poverty figures and assumed that people at that level of poverty meant 
were food insecure: 
Based on data of the 1999 National Household Sample Survey (Pnad) 
carried out by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 
the Zero Hunger Project identified the existence of 9.3 million families 
and 44 million very poor people (with an income of less than one dollar a 
day, or about R$ 80.00 a month in August 2001), respectively, who were 
seen as potential beneficiaries of this project due to their vulnerability to 
hunger. (Graziano et al. 2011139). 
 
While it was likely the case that many of the extremely poor had trouble buying enough 
food, simply assuming that all 44 million of them were hungry is problematic and 
measures of under-nutrition and food security undermine this assumption. 
 
Anthropometric Studies 	  
There were existing studies about under-nutrition in Brazil at this time, however. 
Given their findings, it is not surprising that the 2001 proposal chose not to include them, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
insecurity. 
 
138 For a summary of methods of measures related to hunger see (Leathers and Foster 
2009, Ch. 11). 
 
139 For the original Portuguese see Graziano et al. 2010. I consulted the original 
Portuguese to correct an error in the translation in Graziano et al. (2011). 
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since a traditional nutritional approach to measuring hunger gives much lower figures for 
the percentage of Brazilians who were hungry. Monteiro (2003) writes that in 1996/1997 
the portion of the population in the rural northeast that was underweight, as measured by 
body mass index (BMI), was 7.1%. He contrasts this with rates of 40% in Ethiopia and 
50% in India. Monteiro and colleagues (2010) compare several nationwide studies of 
child stunting, defined as being more than two z scores (standard deviations) below 
normal height for age, using probability samples from the mid 1970's to the present. 
Table 5.1, drawn from their table, provides the stunting rates by income quintile. The 
trend, as the authors point out, is clear: steady decline. They also note that the 
improvement was greatest among the poorest and accelerated over time. The first three 
time points demonstrate that malnutrition was already declining when Lula took office. 
The values for 2006-2007 indicate that this trend continued into his government.  
Remember, these studies measure malnutrition: the end result of a number of 
factors, not only if someone has enough food to eat. So the children that are stunted are 
not necessarily suffering from lack of access to food, since their condition could be due to 
secondary malnutrition. On the other hand, just because a child's height or weight is not 
far enough below the norm for a researcher to say with certainty that she is stunted and/or 
wasted, does not mean that there could not be lower grade malnutrition occurring.  
 
 
 
The 2004 Brazilian Household Sample Survey 	  
These stunting data might lead to the conclusion that there was little to worry 
about.  Turning the focus from severe malnutrition to food insecurity tells a somewhat 
different story. The annual National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) conducted by the 
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Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) employs a standard set of 
questions and a supplemental section, which changes annually. In 2004 this section 
included questions about food security for the first time, a direct result of the 
government's new focus on hunger. 
The measure used, the Brazilian Food Security Scale, is adapted from a U.S. 
Department of Agriculture survey measure (Nord et al. 2010). It asks the head of a 
household a series of fifteen questions about the past ninety days. The instrument begins 
with the least extreme questions ("Household members worry about running out of food 
before they buy or obtain more") and puts them in order of severity (final question: 
"Someone in the household under 18 has spent an entire day without eating because of a 
lack of money to buy food") (IBGE 2006: 25, author’s translation). Questions 10-15 all 
concern children and are thus not asked of households without children. IBGE surveyed 
112,716 households but only about half were asked the food security questions, which 
were only posed to lower-income respondents (Segall-Corrêa et al. 2008). 
The question ordering is of theoretical importance. The idea is that the poor first 
worry about running out of food. If their problems continue they must reduce the quality 
of food, then the quantity, then eventually skip meals entirely (IBGE 2006 25-26). IBGE 
divides households into four categories depending on their score on this scale: food 
security, light insecurity, moderate insecurity, and severe insecurity, corresponding to the 
steps along this process. 
Regarding data quality, sampling methodologies yield data that is representative 
at the state and national level. Not all municipalities are surveyed, the data are not 
 	   105 
representative at the municipal level and, in any case, municipal identifiers are 
suppressed to protect the identities of respondents. 
Table 5.2 summarizes 2004 food security levels, expressed as percentages of 
Brazilian households, showing that just over a third of households reported some kind of 
food insecurity. About half of reported food insecurity is in the light insecurity category. 
Because a respondent answering that she was worried about running out of food once in 
the last ninety days is enough to qualify a household for this category, it is fundamentally 
different from the moderate and severe categories, which reveal changes in actual 
behavior. Thus, like Segall-Corrêa and colleagues (2008) I draw the cutoff point for a 
binary secure/insecure measure between light and moderate. That is, secure and light 
insecurity count as "secure" and moderate insecurity and severe insecurity count as 
"insecure". This biases against finding that food insecurity was a serious problem. Even 
with this more conservative approach, we still have just over one in six Brazilian 
households reporting moderate or sever food insecurity. 
 
Discussion 	  
Taken together, these studies paint a picture of a substantial number of Brazilians 
lowering the quality of their diets, reducing how much they eat, or even skipping meals 
due to poverty, but with this food insecurity much less commonly leading to measurable 
stunting. That anyone was skipping meals was unacceptable according to the standards 
that the Lula Government had set for Brazil. 
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Change under Lula 	  
Fortunately, Brazil repeated the supplemental questions about food security in the 
2009 PNAD, revealing the changes in food security during his government. However, the 
individuals in the 2004 PNAD are not the same as in the 2009 PNAD and, as already 
mentioned, the municipal identifiers are suppressed. This means making a comparison 
over time requires looking at state-level data. This second time point comes at a 
considerable cost: it reduces the sample size from nearly 400,000 individuals to 27 
states140 and introduces risk of the ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950). On the other hand, 
one benefit of the small sample size is that we can closely examine it. Table 5.3 presents 
the rates of food insecurity (again defined as the combination of moderate and serious 
food insecurity) for each state in both years and the change over that five-year period, 
expressed as a change in percentage points. Food insecurity decreased in 26 out of 27 
states. So the overwhelming trend is towards improvement (though the case of food 
insecurity going up in Sergipe merits further investigation). Did Bolsa Família contribute 
to this decrease?  
 
Bolsa Família and Food Prices 
  
What did Bolsa Família mean for households’ ability to buy food, and how has 
this changed over time? The 2008 food crisis caused large increases in world food 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Brazil has 26 states and the Federal District. For ease of language, I simply refer to 
them as 27 states. The Federal District is much larger than the District of Colombia in the 
U.S. and includes several satellite cities in addition to Brasília. 
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prices141 followed by sharp increases in recent years,142 eroding the purchasing power of 
a cash transfer. It is well known that the poorer a person is the larger portion of her 
income is spent on food ("Ernst Engel's Law," see Zimmerman 1932). The poorest 
Brazilian households spend 70 per cent of their income on food (IBASE 2008), making 
them particularly vulnerable to these increases. If the government was truly committed to 
using cash transfers to combat food insecurity, it would have to increase benefits to keep 
up with food prices. 
A conditional cash transfer's impact on food entitlement will obviously depend on 
food prices.  Since the size of Bolsa Família payments increased over time and food 
prices rise and fall, the exact food entitlement is constantly changing. Sen (1981) and 
Drèze and Sen (1989) point out that changes in either income or food prices impact the 
overall entitlement: for example, doubling the price of food will have the same impact of 
cutting a family's food budget in half. The study by IBASE (2008) summarized in 
Chapter 2 found that the average transfer represented about a third of the average food 
budget for beneficiaries, so whether the transfer maintains purchasing power in the face 
of rising food prices make a difference for food security. 
If a family were to spend all of its income from Bolsa Família on food, how much 
food would that buy and how does this change over time? Sen (1981) constructs a simple 
index of wages relative to food prices in order to show differences in food entitlements 
over time. I build a similar index for Bolsa Família. Sen generally uses rice as his index 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 “UN warns of deepening food crisis.” December 9, 2008. BBC. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7774167.stm (Accessed October 25, 2011). 
 
142 “World food prices close to record.” BBC. July 7, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14062360 (Accessed October 25, 2011). 
 
 	   108 
food, because it is a staple food in the cases he analyzes. I construct two indices, one for 
rice and one for beans, since these are still the two staples of the Brazilian diet (IBGE and 
Agência Brasil 2011), and especially important to very poor households (IBASE 2008).  
My index sets the amount of rice and beans someone on Bolsa Família could purchase 
when the program was first created to 1.0. 
Since different families receive different amounts of money it is necessary to 
decide what benefit is typical. Since the average household size of beneficiaries in 2006 
was 4.1 (Lindert et al. 2007), the index looks at a household of four in extreme poverty. It 
makes little difference if the family has one adult or two, since the index is virtually 
identical for both scenarios. 
The FAO provides annual food price data for Brazil. This is the wholesale 
commodity price, expressed as the price per metric ton. The price paid by consumer is 
certainly higher, but I assume that in Brazil's market economy consumers will pay a fairly 
consistent mark-up on these underlying wholesale prices. Data on Bolsa Família benefits 
come from the Ministry of Social Development (MDS 2011), which provides the specific 
date of the benefit increases.  
 	  	  	  
Results and Discussion: Maintaining Purchasing Power 	  
The index for Bolsa Família indicates that the purchasing power in terms of food 
has remained roughly constant. This is more of an achievement than it first appears. 
During the period under consideration the increase in food prices outstripped overall 
inflation. So, had the value of Bolsa Família merely remained constant in terms of overall 
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purchasing power, food entitlement would have declined. ⁠ Bolsa Familia at least battled 
food insecurity to a draw. 
The rise in food prices corresponds to a commodity boom, from which many 
sectors of the Brazilian economy, such as export agriculture, greatly benefited. A 
neoliberal government could have simply ridden out this boom and benefited from the 
additional foreign exchange,143 but the Lula government increased the value of transfers. 
 
Bolsa Família and Food Security at the State Level 	  
If the expansion of Bolsa Família deserves part of the credit for this reduction in 
food insecurity, there should be a greater reduction in food insecurity where there was a 
greater expansion in Bolsa Família coverage (in other words per capita change). I test 
this hypothesis using two methods: a geographic information system (GIS) analysis and 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
 
First Method: Maps 	  
For a first test of this hypothesis, I use the software program ArcGIS to make two 
maps. The first shows the expansion of Bolsa Família at the state level between 2004 and 
2009, defined as the change in percentage of the population receiving it (measured as the 
difference in percentage points). The map divides states into quartiles according to the 
size of this increase. The second shows the change in food insecurity (again defined as 
the combination of moderate and severe insecurity and again measured as difference in 
percentage points) between the same two years, also dividing states into quartiles. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 I thank Fernando Filgueira for framing the issue this way for me in a conversation. 
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food security data again comes from the Brazilian Household Sample Surveys (IBGE 
2006, 2010) and the figures for Bolsa Família coverage come from the Brazilian Institute 
for Geography and Economics (IPEA 2011c).144 
 
Results and Discussion 	  
The maps (figures 5.2 and 5.3) show that the overall pattern is consistent with the 
hypothesis. Overall the north and northeast had greater Bolsa Família expansion and 
greater reduction in food insecurity. This is also the region with the greatest poverty. 
Since Brazil targeted Bolsa Familia at the poorest, the first map is exactly as expected. 
Given that the north and northeast had the highest levels of food insecurity in 2004, they 
had more room for improvement. For example, the northeastern state of Paraíba 
decreased food insecurity by nearly fifteen percentage points. This was impossible for a 
state like Santa Catarina with a lower starting level, in this case six percent.  The maps do 
not include a measure of confidence in this relationship nor do they provide any sense of 
effect size, which is vital for assessing substantive importance. In other words, it would 
be helpful to know: All else being equal, for every ten people added to Bolsa Família 
how many people moved from food insecurity to security?   
 
Rival Explanations 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 For Bolsa Família coverage I use figures from IPEA for the number of households in 
each state and population figures from IBGE. To convert households to individuals I 
multiply the number of households by 4.1, the average number of individuals in a 
household receiving Bolsa Família in 2006, as mentioned earlier. 
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Most importantly, the maps do not account for any rival explanation for the 
decrease in food insecurity, such as economic growth and increased formal sector 
employment. Given that gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is a frequent predictor 
of food insecurity at the national level (Jenkins and Scanlan 2001) it might be that gross 
state product (GSP) predicts food insecurity at the state level. There are many ways this 
could conceivably happen, but they all rely on the most vulnerable sharing in the fruits of 
economic growth (recalling the discussion of "Growth Mediated Security" in Drèze and 
Sen [1989]). The hypothetical impact of formal sector employment is more 
straightforward: by getting jobs in the formal sector people who were previously 
unemployed or in extremely low-income employment increase their earnings and are able 
to afford enough food. 
 
Second Method: Statistical Regression 	  
I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test and compare these rival 
explanations. All variables in my analysis are measured as change between 2004 and 
2009, again expressed as the differences in percentage points. I regress the change in food 
insecurity on change in Bolsa Família coverage, formal sector employment, and 
economic growth. One advantage of using the difference at the state level is it 
automatically controls for any state-level variables present at both time periods. The food 
security and Bolsa Família coverage data come from the same sources as above. I 
measure economic growth using the change in Gross State Product (GSP) per capita for 
each state (IBGE 2009, 2011).145 For the change in formal sector employment I use the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Brazil's official figures (IBGE 2009, 2011) present two methods for measuring Gross 
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RAIS figures from the Brazilian Ministry of Labor (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego 
2012), which I express as the percentage of a state's population employed in the formal 
sector.   
 
Results and Discussion 	  
Even with such a small sample, there is a strong relationship between how much 
food insecurity decreased and how much Bolsa Família coverage increased at the state 
level (see table 5.5). Model 1 provides a bivariate model for Bolsa Família (see also 
Figure 5.4). Models 2 and 3 provide bivariate models for formal sector employment and 
economic growth. Only the model for Bolsa Família is statistically significant. On 
average, a one percentage point increase in the portion of a state's population covered by 
Bolsa Família corresponded to a one-third percentage point decrease in food insecurity. 
In other words, for every three households added to the program one became food 
secure.146 
Models 4 and 5 each include Bolsa Família and one rival explanation. Model 6 
includes all three explanations. Bolsa Família remains significant, the rival explanations 
remain insignificant, and the effect size remains about the same. So the finding is 
somewhat robust.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
State Product. One method is to add up the prices of all goods and services in each state 
using market prices. The other is to measure the value added at each stage. For a concrete 
example, if a car is manufactured in one state and then has tired added in the second, the 
market price method would give the second state all the credit, where the value added 
method gives each state credit for its share of the economic activity. Clearly, the value 
added approach appropriately measures the kind of economic activity that might 
conceivably reduce food insecurity at the state level. 
 
146 Though because of its ecological nature this evidence cannot tell us for sure that these 
are the same individuals, though I see no other plausible explanation. 
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Data limitations make this less than an airtight case. That is, it is consistent with 
the expected relationship but leaves room for doubt. However, this is far from the first 
study of the issue. We know from the IBASE study that households report being able to 
buy more food; the dominant finding of studies of the impact of transfers on malnutrition 
surveyed in Chapter 2 was that conditional cash transfers had a significant impact (Paes-
Sousa and Santos 2009, Segall-Corrêa et al. 2008). So this macro-level study adds one 
more piece of evidence. 
 
Conclusions 	  
Brazil did not experience high levels of severe malnutrition at the time Lula 
announced Zero Hunger, but it did suffer from substantial food insecurity and Bolsa 
Família played an important role in reducing that insecurity. This example supports Sen 
and Drèze's framework, outlined earlier. One way to think about Bolsa Família is as a 
change to Brazil's entitlement framework.147 As a small guaranteed minimum income, 
Bolsa Família expands the role of the state and establishes it as a source of entitlement 
for the very poor. The rules of exchange remain unchanged. This is to say they rely 
largely on the market as a source of food to buy, but are less reliant on it as a source of 
income.148  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Indeed, The Organic Law of Food Security and Nutrition (LOAS) from 2006 (Public 
Law 11.346) amends the Brazilian Constitution to include the right to food, so this can be 
seen as one of the policies working to make this right a reality. 
 
148 This reduction on reliance on the market recalls a definition Epsing-Andersen's gives 
of de-commodification: "the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a 
socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation." (Epsing-
Andersen 1990:37) 
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Bolsa Família represented a consolidation and expansion of conditional cash transfer 
programs from the Cardoso government, and thus a continuation of the basic strategy. 
Chapter 3 contrasted this response to policies with the one taken by the Food Card. 
Chapter 4 showed that Bolsa Família reduced poverty intensity. This chapter provides 
evidence that this reduction in poverty in turn led to a Brazil where more people were 
able to eat three meals a day. 	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Figure 5.1: Model from Paes Sousa and Santos.  
 
 
 
See Paes Sousa and Santos (2009: 14). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Map: Expansion of Bolsa Familia, 2004-2009. 
 
 
 
  
ﬁnancial   beneﬁts   other   than   the   PBF   cash   transfer.   However,   data   presented   here   suggest   that  
the  PBF  interacts  with  the  basic  living  condiƟons  of  beneﬁciary  families,  leading  to  the  improved  
nutriƟonal  status  of  the  children  enrolled  in  the  program  when  compared  to  non-­‐beneﬁciaries.
Figure  2  shows  the  diﬀerent  Ɵmeframe  over  which  the  program  may  impact  on  families.  The  ﬁrst  
impact  is  precisely  the  change  in  dietary  paƩerns  (t1).  The  budget  improvement  produced  by  the  
cash  transferred  allows  beneﬁciary  families  to  spend  more  on  food.  There  is  empirical  evidence  that  
this  actually  happens.  
      
Figure  2.  Time  frame  for  potenƟal  impacts  of  Bolsa  Família  Program    
The  baseline  study  for  the  Bolsa  Família  Program  found  that  enrolled  families  have  higher  expenditure  
than  non-­‐beneﬁciary  families,  and  when  it  comes  to  food,  they  spend  US$172  more  per  year  than  
non-­‐beneﬁciary  families  (Oliveira  et  al  2007).  More  evidence  was  derived  by  analyzing  data  on  food  
security  from  the  NaƟonal  Household  Sampling  Survey  -­‐  PNAD  2004.  The  results  showed  that  the  
average  US$30  transferred  by  the  Bolsa  Família  Program  in  2004,  raised  the   likelihood  of  having  
food  secure  families  by  52%  (Segall-­‐Corrêa,  2008).  
In   another   survey   commissioned   by   the  Ministry   of   Social   Development,   Brandão   et   al.   (2007)  
observed  that  beneﬁciary  families  aspire  to  eaƟng  more  healthy  foods,  such  as  vegetables  and  fruits.  
This  aspiraƟon  could  indeed  consƟtute  an  improvement  in  the  beneﬁciary  families’  diet.  However,  
companies  that  manufacture  low  nutriƟonal  value  foods  have  already  reposiƟoned  themselves  in  
the  market,  targeƟng  this  “new  consumer”  class.  This  could  hamper  a  healthy  change  in  the  eaƟng  
habits  of  households  receiving  the  beneﬁt.  
Reference  t
2
a   relates   to  access   to  primary  educaƟon,  since  this  service  has  wide  coverage   in   the  
country.  Reference t
2
b  can  only  be  achieved  later,  because  the  coverage  of  basic  health  care  services  
is  somewhat  limited,  while  the  network  of  social  welfare  services  (SUAS)  is  even  more  restricted.  
1
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Figure 5.3: Map: Reduction in food insecurity, 2004-2009. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Change in Food Security and Bolsa Família Coverage, 2004-2009.  
 
 
 
 
Grey area is 95% confidence interval. 
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Table 5.1: Child Stunting by income group 
 
 
Year(s) Indicator Poorest 2nd 3rd 4th Richest 
1974-75 Per capita income 59.0 50.8 38.5 25.7 12.1 
1989 Per capita income 39.1 30.6 16.6 7.2 5.1 
1996 Asset-based 30.7 17.9 9.6 5.7 4.9 
2006-07 Asset-based 11.0 9.3 6.8 3.6 4.0 
2006-07 Per capita income 11.2 9.3 5.2 5.9 3.3 
 
From Monteiro et al. (2010) Table 1, p. 307. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Food security Overview, 2004 PNAD 
 
Food Security 65.0% 
Light Insecurity 18.0% 
Moderate Insecurity 9.9% 
Severe Insecurity 7.0% 
Food Insecure (all) 34.9% 
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Table 5.3: Food Insecurity at the State Level 
 
  2004 2009 Change 
Brazil 16.9 11.5 -5.3 
Urbana 15.7 10.8 -4.8 
Rural 23.5 15.6 -7.9 
North 25.2 18.5 -6.6 
Rondônia 12.1 10.3 -1.8 
Acre 31.4 22.0 -9.4 
Amazonas 18.7 13.2 -5.6 
Roraima 44.3 18.7 -25.6 
Pará 30.6 22.7 -8.0 
Amapá 24.8 19.9 -4.9 
Tocantins 20.3 16.8 -3.6 
Northeast 30.7 21.3 -9.4 
Maranhão 41.8 31.2 -10.6 
Piauí 31.7 22.7 -9.0 
Ceará 31.4 23.9 -7.5 
Rio Grande do Norte 36.7 21.8 -14.8 
Paraíba 32.3 17.4 -14.9 
Pernambuco 27.3 17.0 -10.3 
Alagoas 27.0 21.8 -5.2 
Sergipe 13.4 16.3 +2.9 
Bahia 29.5 19.7 -9.8 
Southeast 10.8 7.0 -3.8 
Minas Gerais 13.1 8.3 -4.8 
Espírito Santo 11.0 8.9 -2.2 
Rio de Janeiro 11.7 7.2 -4.5 
São Paulo 9.3 6.2 -3.1 
South 9.5 5.4 -4.1 
Paraná 10.6 6.3 -4.3 
Santa Catarina 6.0 4.3 -1.7 
Rio Grande do Sul 10.2 5.1 -5.1 
Center-west 13.2 9.8 -3.4 
Mato Grosso do Sul 12.3 10.6 -1.6 
Mato Grosso 13.3 7.4 -5.9 
Goiás 14.4 12.2 -2.2 
Federal District 11.0 6.2 -4.8 
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Table 5.4: Entitlement Index for Bolsa Familia  
 
Dates 
Total 
Benefit 
(R$) 
Rice 
Price 
Rice 
Purchased 
Rice 
Index 
Bean 
Price 
Beans 
Purchased 
Bean 
Index 
2003 (Oct-
Dec) 95 585 0.16 1.00 1353.3 0.070 1.00 
2004 (all) 95 634.2 0.15 0.92 1153.3 0.082 1.17 
2005 (all) 95 493.3 0.19 1.19 1305 0.073 1.04 
2006 (all) 95 454.2 0.21 1.29 1190.8 0.080 1.14 
2007 (Jan-
Jul) 95 499.2 0.19 1.17 1305.8 0.073 1.04 
2007 (Aug-
Dec) 112 499.2 0.22 1.38 1305.8 0.086 1.22 
2008 (Jan-
Jun) 112 654.2 0.17 1.05 2384.2 0.047 0.67 
2008 (Jul-
Dec) 122 654.2 0.19 1.15 2384.2 0.051 0.73 
 
 
Example household is an extremely poor family of four. 
 
 
 
Table 5.5: The determinants of food security at the state level, 2004-2009. 
 
	  	   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Bolsa Família -0.335* 	  	   	  	    -0.339* 	  -0.381*	   	  -0.366*	  
	  	   (-2.40) 	  	   	  	   	  (-2.46)	   	  (-2.10)	   	  (-2.03)	  
Formal Sector 	  	   -0.79 	  	   	  -0.825	   	  	   	  -0.803	  
	  	   	  	   (-1.14) 	  	   	  (-1.30)	   	  	   	  (-1.23)	  
Growth 	  	   	  	   0.403 	  	   	  -0.185	   	  -0.108	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   -1.08 	  	   	  (-0.41)	   	  (-0.24)	  
Constant -1.469 -4.014† -8.562*** 	  1.291	   	  0.142	   	  2.159	  
	  	   (-0.62) (-1.60) (-4.06) 	  (0.41)	   	  (0.03)	   	  (0.45)	  
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 
R-squared 	  0.187	   	  0.049	   	  0.044	   	  0.241	   	  0.193	   	  0.243	  
Adjusted R-
Squared 	  0.155	   	  0.011	   	  0.006	   	  0.178	   	  0.126	   	  0.144	  
 
t statistics in parentheses 
† p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (1-tailed tests) 
All variables expressed as differences between 2004 and 2009.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 	  
Summary of Findings 	  
 Governments make policy decisions that directly affect how many of their 
citizens go hungry. These decisions are the result of politics. It is common for political 
scientists to describe politics as a game, because, like a game, politics consists of 
competition structured by a set of rules. This dissertation’s contribution is to bring 
attention to policy implementation, not as a purely technical problem, but as a 
continuation of politics, albeit one less formal than the world of roll call votes and 
presidential vetoes.  
If the theoretical framework from Chapter 2 is correct, it will often be politically, 
as well as technically, more difficult to start a new policy instead of revising inherited 
policies in accordance with a new government’s goals. Chapter 3 used evidence from 
interviews, Brazilian media, and government documents to show that this was precisely 
one of the reasons why Bolsa Família succeeded where the Food Card failed. 
Chapter 2 also explained why, all else being equal, the more complex of two 
policy designs will lead to a greater chance of implementation failure. Again, this is not 
just about the technical process of implementation, but also about how politics continues 
through that process. Every new component is a place for the implementation process to 
break down. This can happen for many different reasons—limited capacity, limited 
recourses, limited competence—but also because of political opposition. The comparison 
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of the Food Card to Bolsa Família in Chapter 3 supported this understanding of policy 
implementation. For example, it showed how the choice to charge the Municipal 
Committees with selecting beneficiaries for the Food Card led to both opposition parties 
and local mayors fearing that the committees would be put to partisan ends.  
Chapter 4 argued that cash transfers can be effective at combating income 
poverty. It analyzed the 2009 Brazilian Household Sample Survey (PNAD) to show that, 
consistent with expectations, Bolsa Família did little to reduce headcount poverty, but led 
to substantively significant reductions in income gap, intensity and ordinal measures of 
poverty. 
Chapter 5 argued that cash transfers can be effective at combating food insecurity. 
After showing that food insecurity decreased between 2004 and 2009, it demonstrated 
that the amount of food a household could buy with Bolsa Familia remained largely 
constant. Geographic information system (GIS) maps and a simple ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression showed that the states where food insecurity decreased the most were 
generally the same states where Bolsa Família’s expansion was the greatest. 
Arriving at conclusions about program effectiveness required thinking carefully 
about concepts of poverty and hunger and how to turn these concepts into measures. The 
idea that concept formation is a key step in the research process is not new (see Sartori 
1970), but is one worth remembering. Thinking about poverty and hunger differently 
leads to different conclusions about Bolsa Família’s effectiveness. There is not one right 
way to measure poverty and hunger, but this dissertation argued that poverty intensity 
and food security are appropriate measures for assessing Lula’s success in achieving his 
goal of a Brazil where everyone eats breakfast, lunch, and dinner. 
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Policy Implications  	  
About 840 million people suffer from hunger; they are about an eighth of the 
world population (FAO et al. 2013). A child dies from hunger every five seconds 
(UNICEF 2006). Does this dissertation offer any useful lessons for the rest of the world 
about how to change this?  
I think that it does. This dissertation’s theoretical framework cannot offer specific 
suggestions for what policies other countries should adopt to combat hunger. The set of 
countries with hungry people is, sadly, a large subset of all the countries in the world. 
Given the tremendous differences among them, I doubt that there is a set of policies that 
would work everywhere. In essence, someone ought to have some specific knowledge of 
Chad before advising Chad on how to combat hunger.  
More modestly, what this dissertation offers—the knowledge that “travels” 
beyond one place and period—is a way of thinking about those choices. What are a 
country’s policy legacies? How can they be an effective starting point? How can that 
country expand upon them in a way that avoids unnecessary complexity in order to 
increase the chance of success? None of these arguments are new. Indeed all of them date 
back to at least the 1970’s or 1980’s, as Chapter 2 made clear. 
 In more general terms the argument about legacies dates at least 120 years earlier 
than that. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte Marx (1972 [1852]: 595) 
famously writes that “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.” Understanding that 
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women and men cannot make anti-hunger policy “just as they please” is this 
dissertation’s key lesson. 
 The arguments about simplicity and complexity were not only present in the 
research discussed in Chapter 2, but also in debates within the PT. As we saw in Chapter 
3, Ana Fonseca, Eduardo Suplicy, and Cristovam Buarque were all prominent advocates 
of a simplified approach that avoided fragmentation and for building on existing cash 
transfers. Yet Lula initially opted for Graziano’s overly complex, fresh start approach 
until it was clear that the keep-it-simple contingent was correct. 
 These lessons are timely, as there is continuing interest in Zero Hunger as a 
“model” for other countries. The op-ed from India quoted in Chapter 1 is but one 
example. Brazil has inspired a steady spread of zero hunger campaigns in other countries, 
including Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Antigua and Barbuda, and South Africa.149 
 The Brazilian government “is engaged in globally diffusing the knowledge of the 
Zero Hunger Strategy throughout the developing world” (Fraundorfer 2013). The Latin 
American and Caribbean regional office of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
has a Hunger Free Latin America and the Caribbean Initiative150 started when Graziano 
headed that office. Now the United Nations has a worldwide campaign called The Zero 
Hunger Challenge.151 In addition to various private NGOs, the challenge brings together 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Cero Hambre [Zero Hunger] in Guatemala, Sin Hambre Cruzada Nacional [National 
Crusade Against Hunger] in Mexico, Programa Hambre Cero [Zero Hunger Program] in 
Nicaragua, Zero Hunger Challenge in Antigua and Barbuda, and Food for All in South 
Africa. 
 
150 http://www.rlc.fao.org/en/initiative/the-initiative/ 
 
151 http://www.un.org/en/zerohunger/ 
 	   124 
many UN agencies whose work touches on hunger, including The FAO. The FAO’s 
current director: José Graziano, elected in July 2011.  
 Brazil lobbied hard for Graziano’s candidacy, housing his campaign in the 
Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamarty). The key argument for electing him was that, 
having led Zero Hunger, he could bring this successful experience to the rest of the 
world. The pamphlet for his candidacy summed up his experience as follows: 
In 2001, Graziano da Silva led the formulation of the Zero Hunger Program and was 
subsequently appointed to the position of Extraordinary Minister of Food Security 
and [the] Fight Against Hunger to implement it. The program has helped to lift 24 
million people out of poverty in five years and to reduce undernourishment in Brazil 
by 25%.152 
It conveniently omits his departure from the position after a year, the abolition of his 
special ministry, or that Bolsa Família was in direct competition with his ministry’s Food 
Card. Likewise, recent media coverage painting Graziano as the protagonist behind Zero 
Hunger makes it look like Bolsa Família was the natural outgrowth of his leadership and 
he deserves credit for it.153 
Spin is part of politics. Just because Brazil’s Zero Hunger Program crashed and 
burned under Graziano’s leadership does not mean he will repeat the same mistakes at the 
FAO. Indeed he may have learned from them. My worry is that the selective retelling of 
Zero Hunger might give others the wrong idea of how to succeed in achieving the same 
kinds of gains against poverty and hunger as Brazil. In other words, it could lead to a 
flawed theory that in turn leads to flawed policies.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 “Graziano da Silva: Candidate to the position of Director – General of FAO.” 2011. 
Pamphlet. Print. 
 
153 Vaisman, Cecilia. April 4. 2012. “Brazil delivers on hunger promise.” Marketplace. 
Available at: http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/food-9-billion/brazil-
delivers-hunger-promise (Accessed November 17, 2013);  
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 In 1932, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt summed up the trial-and-error 
approach to public policy as follows: 
The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, 
persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it: If it fails, 
admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something. (Roosevelt 1932: 646) 
 
For all the problems discussed in Chapter 3, Brazil tried something (the Food Card) and, 
when that did not work, tried something else (Bolsa Família); Chapters 4 and 5 
demonstrated that Lula’s second take at using cash transfers to reduce poverty and hunger 
worked well. In my experience people familiar with Zero Hunger know this is what 
happened. The issue with spinning to make it look like things went fine on the first try is 
more than one of intellectual honesty. While I understand the political reasons not to 
frankly admit the early errors—which were hardly surprising given that the PT was just 
learning how to govern at the federal level—I fear that some people looking to learn from 
Brazil’s experience will buy the tidy narrative and not understand the lessons to be 
learned from these mistakes. For instance, I fear they may read the English translation of 
the 2001 proposal (in Graziano et al. 2011), think that this is the blueprint for what Brazil 
actually did, and attempt to copy that. 
 What does it mean to use Brazil as a model? One approach would be to use the 
Zero Hunger brand as a way of communicating the shared goal of a set of initiatives, 
regardless of how connected the government of those initiatives is. The Lula 
Government’s slogan for the Brazilian federal government as a whole was “Brazil: A 
Country for All” (Brasil: Um país de todos). President Rousseff’s slogan is “Brazil: A 
rich country is a country without poverty” (Brasil: Um país rico é um país sem pobreza). 
Her major anti-poverty initiative is Brazil without Misery (Brasil Sem Miséria). 
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 I suspect Brazil’s “umbrella approach” would have worked just as well with a 
different label. Granted, branding is important—“Brazil: slowly getting fairer” does not 
inspire the same effect—but the substance of the policies is essential.  When it comes to 
specific policies, simply trying to “copy and paste” what a large, federal, urbanized, 
middle-income country did into a wildly different context seems unwise. 
 
Cash Transfers 	  
 A country looking to copy policies from Brazil would likely consider Bolsa 
Família a prime candidate. Indeed, cash transfers, both conditional and unconditional, 
have been spreading around the world. Nearly every country in Latin America and the 
Caribbean has some kind of cash transfer (Fonseca 2008). So should other countries 
adopt this approach? 
 Not so fast, argues Drèze:   
CCT [Conditional Cash Transfer] enthusiasm…is often based on a superficial 
reading of the Latin American experience. In Brazil, Mexico and other pioneers of 
this approach, CCTs were used to bring into the fold of health and education 
services a fringe of marginalised households...154  
 
He agrees that conditional cash transfers can be effective incentives to get people to use 
services, but expresses misgivings about expecting more from them: 
What is remarkably dangerous…is the illusion that CCTs can replace public services 
by enabling recipients to buy health and education services from private providers. 
This is not how CCTs work in, say, Brazil or Mexico. In Latin America, CCTs are 
usually seen as a complement, not a substitute, for public provision of health, 
education and other basic services. The incentives work because the services are there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Drèze, Jean. May 11, 2011. “The cash mantra.” The Indian Express. Available at: 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-cash-mantra/788791/ (Accessed November 17, 
2013). For a more extensive version of this argument see Chapter 7 in Drèze and Sen 
(2013). 
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in the first place. In India, these basic services are still missing to a large extent, and 
CCTs are no substitute. 
 
 In other words, these countries had policy legacies—having established these 
services—that made the conditional cash transfer approach an effective next step. Other 
countries ignore this at their peril. Another legacy Drèze points out is that Latin 
American countries already had systems of social insurance that covered large parts of 
the country. So targeting “makes some sense, because the bulk of the population is 
already covered and the rest is (relatively) easy to identify…”  
 Drèze goes on to discuss the relative advantages of giving people food vs. cash, 
arguing that one advantage of direct food support is that it is inflation proof. A kilo of 
rice is a kilo of rice is a kilo of rice. It is difficult to imagine Bolsa Família working in 
the era before Brazil put an end to hyperinflation. The need to constantly adjust benefit 
sizes to make them have any significant purchasing power would have greatly 
complicated the program. So in this case the simplicity of the cash approach is partly a 
result of a policy legacy from the Itamar Franco government. 
 Given that, countries experiencing high inflation should think carefully about the 
choice of cash vs. food. Part of the reason distributing basic baskets was so complicated 
in Brazil (Chapter 3) is doubtless the size of the country and challenging terrain. Just as a 
different economic context might make the cash approach comparatively more difficult, 
different geography might make food distribution comparatively easier. The choice will 
depend on context, as well as legacies. For example, Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 
(2010) find that food transfers were more effective than cash in Ethiopia during a period 
when it suffered from high inflation. 
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Politics 	  
 The policies appropriate for a given country are not the only thing that will be 
different; the politics will be different as well. Brazil is a diverse half-continent with 
asymmetrical federalism. This is hardly the modal country in the world. Different 
countries have different politics and this leads to different policy outcomes. We know 
this. So, if hunger is political those differences in politics will result in differences in 
policies relevant to hunger, which will in turn result in differences in outcomes. That has 
been a central premise throughout this dissertation. 
 When scholars (e.g. Drèze and Sen 1989) or activists (eg. Lappé et al. 1998) 
frame hunger a political problem the implied model seems to be: 
1a) Progressives win an election, or 
1b) Progressives mobilize to pressure the government, resulting in a situation where 
2) The government commits to combat hunger. 
3) The government enacts policies to combat hunger. 
4) These policies reduce hunger. 
Politics does not stop at step two or three; it runs through the entire process. 
Implementation, as we saw in Chapter 3, is full of politics, but of a different sort: rivalries 
between ministers in the same party, mayors who operate in a world of personalistic 
factions and not ideology, citizens charged with picking which of their neighbors are 
most needy. 
 The political context—and corresponding policy legacies—will be different in 
each situation. Policymakers must respond by taking this into account, but in doing so 
they should think about the relative complexity of their alternatives. If I am correct that 
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complexity hamstrung Zero Hunger in its first year—along with the wider literature 
arguing this is true of policy implementation more generally—this suggests that 
policymakers should seek the simplest program likely to achieve its goal.  
 In spite of these cautionary lessons, Brazil gives us reason to be hopeful. Its 
experience with Zero Hunger teaches that: 
• It is possible for a government to reduce hunger. 
• A government does not have to get things right the first time to succeed. 
• A program does not need to be perfect to be effective 
 
It is because of these encouraging lessons that governments and international 
organizations are engaged in zero hunger campaigns of their own. I am glad to see so 
many working earnestly to fight hunger. The only general advice I can offer them is this: 
if possible build on the work of those before you. Keep it simple. Be persistent. 
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